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Capitalizing Adolescence: Juvenile Offenders
on Death Row
MARY BERKHEISER*
"[Aldolescents commit crimes, as they live their lives, in groups."
-Franklin E. Zimring'
In October of its 2004-05 Term, the United States Supreme Court
heard the State of Missouri's challenge to the ruling of that state's high
court that the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
hibits the execution of individuals who were only sixteen or seventeen at
the time of their capital crimes.2 In August 2003, the Missouri Supreme
Court set aside the death sentence imposed against Christopher Sim-
mons in 1994, and re-sentenced him to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole for a crime he committed when he was seventeen
years old.3 The basis for the Missouri court's decision was its conclu-
sion that executing our young is inherently cruel and unusual, and there-
fore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.'
Like the majority of the seventy-two adolescents serving death
sentences across the country, Simmons was convicted of a murder he did
not commit alone.5 The night Christopher Simmons and his friend,
Charles Benjamin, set out to rob and kill the man the boys in the neigh-
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I
am grateful for the financial support of the James E. Rogers Scholarship Grant fund and for the
persistence and good humor of my able research assistants, Peggy King and Monique McVoy.
I. Franklin E. Zimring, Kids, Groups and Crime: Some Implications of a Well-Known
Secret, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 867, 867 (1981).
2. Roper v. Simmons, 540 U.S. 1160 (2004). See infra notes 158-68 and accompanying text
for a brief history of the juvenile death penalty.
3. State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 400 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
4. Roper, 112 S.W.2d at 399.
5. State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165, 169-70 (Mo. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 522 U.S.
953 (1997).
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borhood called the "voodoo man," they were not prepared for what they
encountered. 6 Instead of finding the target of their mischief, Simmons
and Benjamin were startled by his wife, who was home alone.7 It all
went downhill from there.8 After nearly ten years on death row, Sim-
mons got a reprieve, at least for a time.9 The same cannot be said, how-
ever, for Napoleon Beazley, Scott Allen Hain, T.J. Jones, or Toronto
Patterson. These young offenders were executed between May and
November of 20020 for participating in homicides which, like Sim-
mons, they neither intended to commit nor committed alone. All four
started as robberies with friends, and all four ended with the unantici-
pated death of the robbery victims.' So too for Kevin Stanford and
Heath Wilkins, the teenagers whose death sentences led the United
States Supreme Court to conclude in 1989 that the Constitution does not
prohibit the execution of those convicted of crimes committed at ages
sixteen and seventeen. 12  In each case, the juvenile offender who
6. Id. at 169-70.
7. Id. at 170.
8. Simmons was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death, id., while his co-
defendant was spared the death penalty because he was fifteen at the time of the burglary. Id. at
169. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibit the execution of one who was fifteen at the time of the offense).
9. Reaction to the Supreme Court's decision to review the Missouri Supreme Court's
conclusion that execution of individuals below the age of eighteen violates the Eighth Amendment
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment has been mixed. Some court watchers
optimistically view the Court's decision to re-examine its 1989 ruling in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492
U.S. 361 (1989), as a sign that the Court is ready to extend to sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds the
death penalty exemption the Court recognized for fifteen-year-olds in Thompson v. Oklahoma,
487 U.S. 815 (1988). See Press Release, National Mental Health Association, Supreme Court to
Consider Ban on Juvenile Executions (Jan. 26, 2004), http://www.nmha.org/newsroom/system/
news.vw.cfm?do=vw&rid=582; see also Stephen Henderson, Court to Weigh Executing Young
Killers, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Jan. 27, 2004, at A03. Others are concerned that the Court does
not yet have the five votes necessary to reach that conclusion and fear that Simmons will be the
vehicle for the Court to reject arguments for extending to juveniles the Court's 2002 rationale in
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (exempting mentally retarded persons from the death
penalty). Id.; see also Tony Mauro, Court Opens Execution Issue, 27 LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 2, 2004,
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jspid=1074819338880.
10. Napoleon Beazley was executed May 28, 2002; T.J. Jones, August 8, 2002; Toronto
Patterson, August 28, 2002; and Scott Allen Hain, April 3, 2003. See VICTOR L. STREIB, THE
JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY TODAY: DEATH SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS FOR JUVENILE CRIMES,
JANUARY 1, 1973 - DECEMBER 31, 2004, ISSUE #76 (2005), available at http://www.law.onu.edu/
faculty/streib/documents/JuvDeathDec2004.pdf (last modified Jan. 31, 2005).
11. Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2001) (two co-defendants; incident began as
driveway carjacking); Hain v. State, 852 P.2d 744 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993) (one co-defendant;
incident began as robbery of couple sitting in car outside bar); Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642
(Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (three co-defendants; incident began as carjacking); Patterson v. Johnson,
No. 3:99cv808-G, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14159 (N.D. Tex. May 14, 2001) (Patterson claimed he
learned of murders from two Jamaican men, who forced him to commit robbery out of which
murders arose, but no one else was arrested or tried).
12. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 365, 366 (seventeen-year-old Stanford; sixteen-year-old Heath
Wilkins). Wilkins' capital murder conviction and death sentence were reversed in 1996. Wilkins
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received the death penalty was with at least one of his friends when a
robbery went bad. 3
These cases illustrate what Zimring calls the "well-known secret"
of youth crime: "adolescents commit crimes, as they live their lives, in
groups."' 4 Not one to mince words, Zimring goes even further, stating:
"No fact of adolescent criminality is more important than what sociolo-
gists call its group context."' 5 Yet one can search the law, both criminal
and juvenile, for some recognition of this fact, and will come up empty.
Zimring explains this anomaly:
It is sometimes possible both to know something important and to
ignore that knowledge. To do this is to generate the phenomenon of
the well-known secret, an obvious fact that we ignore. When Edgar
Allen Poe suggested [in The Purloined Letter] that the best location
to hide something is the most obvious place, he was teaching applied
law and social science.' 6
Would Napoleon Beazley, Scott Allen Hain, T.J. Jones, or Toronto
Patterson have committed the crimes for which they were executed if
they had been alone? We will never know, not just because they cannot
tell us what happened, but because there are no clear answers to ques-
tions so complex as what causes one to kill. However, understanding
the role in juvenile homicide of peer group influence and its offshoot,
group offending, is essential to understanding youth violence and how
best to address it in our legal system.
This article attempts to aid that understanding. Taking as its sample
group the present population of seventy-two juvenile offenders on death
row, 17 the article examines the roles of peer influence and group offend-
v. Bowersox, 933 F. Supp. 1496 (W.D. Mo. 1996) (invalidating waiver of counsel and guilty
plea), affid, 145 F.3d 1006 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1094 (1999). The Governor of
Kentucky announced his plans to commute Stanford's sentence to life without the possibility of
parole on June 18, 2003. Andrew Wolfson, Patton Pardons Four in Election Case and Will
Commute Death Sentence, THE COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville), June 19, 2003, at IA. Governor
Patton did commute the sentence to life without parole on December 8, 2003. See American Bar
Association, Juvenile Death Penalty Cases, at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/uvcases.
html#watch (last visited Jan. 22, 2005).
13. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 365 (Stanford was with one other teenager); Wilkins, 933 F. Supp. at
1501 (Wilkins was with three other teens). William Wayne Thompson, a fifteen-year-old whose
death sentence was reversed by the Supreme Court in 1988, had three accomplices, all adults.
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 819, 838.
14. Zimring, supra note 1, at 867.
15. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE 80 (1998).
16. Zimring, supra note 1, at 867.
17. 1 decided to study death row inmates not because their status on death row might be of
special analytical significance or because they are different in some legally or factually relevant
fashion from their counterparts serving life sentences or terms of years, but for the simple
pragmatic reason that it was a more manageable group to study. Studying those who have
received death sentences also presented a greater likelihood of finding the factual details necessary
20051
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ing in the murders committed by those now awaiting execution. Based
on that examination, the article suggests certain reforms in the capital
trials of juveniles. To set the stage, the article first marshals the evi-
dence supporting the "group crime" theory of youth violence and then
discusses the critical role of peers in adolescent development and group
offending of a violent nature.
I. GROUP OFFENDING
A. Group Offending in General
The most consistently reported feature of teenage criminality is its
group nature. "The cold criminological facts are these: The teen years
are characterized by what has long been called group offending." 8 The
high rate of group involvement in violence during adolescence sets teen-
agers apart from adults and provides a distinctly adolescent developmen-
tal context for examining youth violence. Over the years, popular
culture has presented countless images of teenagers acting out in groups
of their peers-in the feature films West Side Story' 9 and Boyz N the
Hood,2" to name just a couple, and in popular novels like William Gold-
ing's Lord of the Fliesz" and S.E. Hinton's The Outsiders22 and Rumble
Fish.23
As with popular images of rowdy teens, social scientists studying
delinquent and criminal behavior present differing views of what a
"group" is.24 Criminologists like Reiss traditionally consider the fact of
multiple offenders sufficient to constitute an offending "group,
' 25
whereas sociologists and social psychologists would require additional
elements, including an established role structure and shared identity,
norms, and goals. 26 These varying understandings of what constitutes a
for this work because of the additional legal procedures, including presentation of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances at sentencing, applicable in capital cases.
18. ZIMRING, supra note 15, at 79. But see Delbert S. Elliott & Scott Menard, Delinquent
Friends and Delinquent Behavior: Temporal and Developmental Patterns, in DELINQUENCY AND
CRIME: CURRENT THEORIES 28, 31 (J. David Hawkins ed., 1996) (calling* assertions that
delinquency is group behavior "overstated" and finding the age, race, and gender of the offender
and the nature of the offense better predictors of group offending). Elliott and Menard's critique
of group offending theory is itself a bit overstated; even their own work supports the role of peer
influence in delinquency. See infra notes 46, 47 and accompanying text.
19. WEST SIDE STORY (MGM/UA 1961).
20. Boyz N THE HOOD (Columbia/Tristar 1991).
21. WILLIAM GOLDING, LORD OF THE FLIES (1954).
22. S.E. HINTON, THE OUTSIDERS (Penguin Putnam Inc. 2003) (1967).
23. S.E. HINTON, RUMBLE FISH (1975).
24. Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Co-Offender Influences on Criminal Careers, in 2 CRIMINAL CAREERS
AND "CAREER CRIMINALS" 121, 122 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1986).
25. Id. at 123.
26. MARK WARR, COMPANIONS IN CRIME: THE SOCIAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT 5
[Vol. 59:135
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group may account for much of the literature that treats delinquent
groups as synonymous with gangs.27 The two are quite different, how-
ever. Gangs are typically characterized by their territorial organization,
well-defined and powerful leadership, and involvement in a wide array
of activities, and are best understood as a highly-organized subset of the
larger category of "groups. '"28 In fact, most juveniles who engage in
group offending are not members of gangs.29 As early as 1929, research
studies conducted by Shaw and his colleagues revealed that most delin-
quent acts were not committed by such highly-structured and well-
organized groups as gangs.3° Instead, juveniles tended to participate in
social networks made up of two to four individuals with little structure
and no clear leadership.3'
Studies dating back more than eighty years document the fact of
group offending among juveniles.32 Breckinridge and Abbott concluded
in their 1917 study that most juveniles commit delinquent offenses with
at least one other person and that "even most youths regarded as lone
offenders occasionally engage in delinquency with a companion. 33 In
1931, Shaw and McKay conducted a study for the first National Crime
(2002) (citing GEORGE A. THEODORSON & ACHILLES G. THEODORSON, A MODERN DICTIONARY
OF CRIMINOLOGY (1979)).
27. See, e.g., W.B. MILLER, VIOLENCE BY YOUTH GANGS AND YOUTH GROUPS AS A CRIME
PROBLEM IN MAJOR AMERICAN CITIES 9 (1975).
28. Id.
29. Merry Morash, Gangs, Groups and Delinquency, 23 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 309 (1983);
Malcolm W. Klein & Lois Y. Crawford, Groups, Gangs and Cohesiveness, 4 J. RESEARCH CRIME
& DELINQUENCY 142 (1967); WARR, supra note 26, at 5. Sociologist Mark Warr recently noted
that the point at which a group becomes a gang "has been debated for decades in the gang
literature with no sign of imminent closure. Still, there is general agreement, supported by
empirical evidence, that gangs constitute only a small fraction of delinquent groups." Id.
(citations omitted).
30. Clifford R. Shaw & Henry D. McKay, Male Juvenile Delinquency as Group Behavior, in
REPORT ON THE CAUSES OF CRIME 191 (II Wickersham Comm'n Rep. No. 13, 1931), reprinted as
Chapter 17 in THE SOCIAL FABRIC OF THE METROPOLIS 252 (James Short ed., 1971) [hereinafter
Male Juvenile]; Clifford R. Shaw & E.D. Meyer, The Juvenile Delinquent, in THE ILLINOIS CRIME
SURVEY (1929) [hereinafter Juvenile Delinquent].
31. Reiss, supra note 24, at 123 (treating group offending "from the perspective of social
networks made up of pairs, triads, and constellations of four or more persons"), citing Paul
Lerman, Gangs, Networks, and Subcultural Delinquency, 73 AMER. J. SOCIOLOGY 63, 63 (1967);
Lewis Yablonsky, The Delinquent Gang As a Near-Group, 7 SoC. PROBLEMS 108 (1959)
(referring to more loosely formed aggregations of delinquent youth as "near-groups," in which
leadership is unclear and turnover is fairly high). Studies in 1929 and 1931 estimated from court
samples a modal size of two or three participants. Male Juvenile, supra note 30, at 259; Juvenile
Delinquent, supra note 30. A 1970 study found two to be the modal size and groups of four or
larger relatively uncommon after age fifteen. ROGER HOOD & RICHARD SPARKS, KEY ISSUES IN
CRIMINOLOGY 87-88 (1970).
32. See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
33. Reiss, supra note 24, at 126 (citing SOPHONISBA P. BRECKINRIDGE & EDITH ABBOTT, THE
DELINQUENT CHILD AND THE HOME (1917)).
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Commission entitled Male Juvenile Delinquency as Group Behavior, in
which eighty percent of boys accused of delinquent acts were alleged to
have had at least one co-participant. 31 Shaw and McKay's results con-
firmed a 1923 study that found group involvement by ninety percent of
juvenile offenders charged with theft35 and a 1929 study by Shaw that
found, based on estimates in juvenile court samples, fewer than twenty
percent of juvenile offenders acted alone.36 As powerful as the early
studies were, they did not significantly influence juvenile justice policy,
causing Zimring to note in 1981 "a tendency to revert to individualistic
models when discussing serious [juvenile] crime."37
Even so, studies in the 1970s and early 1980s revealed that, like
their less violent predecessors, juveniles were committing even the most
serious offenses in groups.38 Data from the National Crime Panel in
1973 showed a striking difference between robberies committed by
those under and over the age of twenty-one: two-thirds of those under
twenty-one acted with others, compared with only slightly over one-
third of those twenty-one and older.39 A 1979 Rand Corporation study
of a sample of armed robbery arrests, which were referred to the juvenile
court in Los Angeles, found more than eighty percent of the incidents
attributable to group offenders in the under-eighteen population.4 ° Simi-
larly, a 1981 Vera Institute of Justice analysis of a sample of delin-
quency referrals to New York's Family Court4' reported that juveniles
acted with others in nearly ninety percent of all robberies and burglaries,
and in nearly eighty percent of sodomies and homicides.42 Studies as
recent as 1996 report consistently high "group violation rates" among
juveniles; in one study only two of twelve offenses had group violation
rates below fifty percent.43 Because most data are derived from reports
34. Male Juvenile, supra note 30, at 255. Shaw and McKay's study group was the entire
population of boys who appeared in the juvenile court of Cook County (Chicago), Illinois on
charges of delinquency in 1928. Id. at 253-54.
35. Id. at 256, n.2.
36. Juvenile Delinquent, supra note 30.
37. Zimring, supra note 1, at 869.
38. Id. at 869-72.
39. Id. at 870 (citing National Crime Panel data, provided by Wesley Skogan, Northwestern
University (64% for under-twenty-one group; 39% for twenty-one and over)).
40. Id. at 872 (citing Rand Corporation, Juvenile Record Study (1979) (only 18% acted
alone)).
41. Id. at 870-71. In the New York system, offenders under age sixteen (not eighteen, as in
most jurisdictions) are eligible for family court processing and disposition. Id. at 870, 872.
42. Id. at 871 (citing Vera Institute of Justice, Family Court Disposition Study (1981)
(unpublished draft) (gun robbery, 90%; other robbery, 87%; burglary, 86%; sodomy, 77%;
homicide, 78%)). Only rape (50%) and assault (60%) had percentages inconsistent with the 80%
group offender norm. Id.




of incidents, not total numbers of offenders, even the reported high per-
centages of group offending are likely understated.4" For example, one
study found that about one-half of all burglaries in a particular city over
a period of eight years were committed by juveniles in groups, but those
burglaries involved two-thirds of all juvenile offenders.45
Data on age progression in group offending vary marginally from
study to study, but the general trend is for the proportion of juvenile
offending in peer groups to increase up to age fifteen or sixteen, hold
steady until the late teens or early twenties, and then decline.4 6 Moreo-
ver, as youths move from age seventeen or eighteen onward, their ties to
peers lessen,47 and those who were involved in only group offending in
their teenage years tend not to offend as adults.48 Thus, the criminal
behavior of group-only teens appears to be dominated more by group
solidarity than by individual motivation to offend.49
Jeffrey Fagan, Professor of Law at Columbia Law School, observes
that a number of mechanisms underlie juveniles' desistance from crime
as they enter adulthood: "The assumption of adult social roles, with
their accompanying increase both in social control and stakes in con-
formity, provides one explanation for desistance. Changes in the daily
routines of adult life decrease the influence of peers while substituting
the informal control of adult social networks. 5 ° In addition, improve-
ments in decision-making abilities and judgment as a result of changing
44. WARR, supra note 26, at 33.
45. Reiss, supra note 24, at 123.
46. Elliott & Menard, supra note 18, at 45 (basing their statistics on the National Youth
Survey, conducted 1976-80 and 1983, of self-reporting youth, and finding delinquent peer group
membership increasing up to age fifteen, remaining stable until age eighteen, and declining from
age nineteen on); HOOD & SPARKS, supra note 31, at 87-88 (finding that a majority of offenders
have accomplices until their early twenties, after which majority commit offenses alone).
47. Elliott & Menard, supra note 18, at 45.
48. Reiss, supra note 24, at 148. Studies of desistance from criminal 'careers' show that
delinquents who continued their course of crime after their teens were more likely to commit their
offenses alone, while those labeled as 'temporary delinquents' (having no criminal activity after
age seventeen) were involved only in group offending. Id. (citing B. J. Knight & D. J. West,
Temporary and Continuing Delinquency, 15 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 43, 45 (1975)); see also Elliott
& Menard, supra note 18, at 48 (explaining that by age twenty-two to twenty-four, two-thirds of
the sample from the National Youth Survey were nonoffenders of crimes that would be criminal if
committed by an adult and, thus, could not be accounted for by changes associated with status
offenses).
49. Knight & West, supra note 48, at 45.
50. Jeffrey Fagan, This Will Hurt Me More Than It Hurts You: Social and Legal
Consequences of Criminalizing Delinquency, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 1, 31
(2002) (citing Jeffrey Fagan & Deanna L. Wilkinson, Guns, Youth and Social Identity, in YoUTH
VIOLENCE 373 (Michael Tonry & Mark H. Moore eds., 1998)) [hereinafter Criminalizing
Delinquency]; Jeffrey Fagan & Deanna L. Wilkinson, Social Contexts and Functions of
Adolescent Violence, in VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS 55 (Beatrix Hamburg et al. eds., 1998)
[hereinafter Adolescent Violence].
20051
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
perceptions of risk and of the temporal dimensions of decision-making
reduce the need to go along with offending peers. 5 ' The shift from
group offending to lone offending or to no offending at all in adulthood
underscores the group nature of juvenile offending for crimes in general.
B. Group Homicide
Like criminality in general, homicide data reveal several distinct
patterns that set juveniles apart from adults. Those discussed briefly
here are age, gender, and the relationship between the offender and the
victim.
First, although adult homicide is generally a lone-offender crime,52
juvenile homicide is at least as likely to be committed by a group as by
solo actors. For example, between 1980 and 1999, multiple offenders
committed a full fifty percent of all juvenile homicides,53 more than
twice the proportion of adults who acted with others.54 Zimring con-
cluded in his 1984 analysis of youth homicide in New York City that
"[p]atterns of homicide in New York differ from killings by adults: the
younger the offender, the greater the difference."55 Even though homi-
cide is rare among young offenders, the younger the homicide offender,
the more likely he is to have killed with others and to have done so
while engaged in another crime, such as burglary. 6 Zimring's study
also reported that between the ages of fourteen and sixteen, groups com-
mit nearly fifty percent of homicides; thereafter, the proportion of group
offenses declines-to thirty percent for seventeen-year-olds and twenty-
five percent for eighteen-year-olds.57 A similar report of all juvenile
homicides in New York State revealed that, in the few murders commit-
ted by children under twelve, the child acted alone; but among thirteen-
to fifteen-year-olds, sixty percent of the murders were by multiple
offenders, and among those sixteen to nineteen, fifty percent were group
51. Criminalizing Delinquency, supra note 50, at 31.
52. Franklin E. Zimring, Youth Homicide in New York: A Preliminary Analysis, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 81, 91 (1984).
53. Howard N. Snyder, Law Enforcement and Juvenile Crimne, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND
VICTIMS NATIONAL REPORT SERIES BULLETIN 1, at 8 (U.S. Dep't of Justice Office of Juvenile
Justice & Delinquency Prevention, 2001). The Bulletin is published in the intervening years
between the quadrennial publication of the Juvenile Offenders and Victims National Report Series
by the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
54. ZIMRING, supra note 15, at 152.
55. Zimring, supra note 1, at 89.
56. Id. at 91; see also John S. Rowley et al., Juvenile Homicide: The Need for an
Interdisciplinary Approach, 5 BEHAV. SC. & L. 3, 7 (1987) ("Intrafamilial homicides in this
sample [of 787 juvenile homicides] were almost never incidental to theft offenses. Yet 6% of the
acquaintance homicides and 58% of the stranger homicides were incidental to theft offenses.").




Among the age-related findings, perhaps the most remarkable is the
finding that, for homicide in the 1980s and 1990s, more than half-sixty
percent-of the juveniles' co-offenders were adults.5 9 This statistic sup-
ports the suggestion by one writer of a pattern of homicidal violence in
which:
[O]ne actor, probably the older and/or more violent one, initiates the
violence against the victim and then induces the other actor, the
younger and/or less violent one, to join in the violence against the
victim. The atrocious nature of these crimes further suggests that the
joint involvement of the perpetrators works to create a situation in
which the juveniles are unable to stop with simply killing the victim,
but instead go on to inflict gratuitous and especially heinous violence.
Specifically, it may be that the violence of one perpetrator feeds
upon-or is somehow stimulated by-that of the other and thereby
escalates to the point of atrocity.6"
The latter point is also consistent with reports of the particularly heinous
nature of juvenile killing, which other researchers have attributed to the
lack of impulse control prevalent during adolescence. 61 Violence feed-
ing upon violence may also explain what others have described as the
"involuntary" repetition of acts such as stabbing or pulling the trigger,
which accounts for murders that appear to be, but in actuality are not,
motivated by a person's particularly cruel and depraved nature.62
Second, homicide by multiple offenders is both gender and victim
specific. Most girls kill alone, while boys acting together account for
more than half of all juvenile murders.63 Multiple offenders kill more
than two-thirds of the strangers killed by juveniles and more than forty
percent of acquaintances, but less than twenty percent of family mem-
bers.' It is not surprising, therefore, that when the victim of a multiple-
offender homicide is a family member, girls are the offenders over
ninety percent of the time.65
58. CHARLES PATRICK EWING, WHEN CHILDREN KILL: THE DYNAMICS OF JUVENILE HOMICIDE
11 (1990) (citing NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, OFFICE OF JUSTICE
SYSTEM ANALYSIS, NEW YORK STATE HOMICIDE 1987 (1988)).
59. Snyder, supra note 53, at 18.
60. EWING, supra note 58, at 55.
61. See infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., Marty Beyer, Immaturity, Culpability & Competency in Juveniles: A Study of 17
Cases, 15 CRIM. JUST. 26, 27 (2000), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/
cjmimmculcom.html.
63. See supra notes 53, 58 and accompanying text.
64. Rowley et al., supra note 56, at 8 (68.6% strangers; 42.1% acquaintances); see also
EWING, supra note 58, at 10.
65. Rowley et al., supra note 56, at 7-8 (finding girls the offenders in twenty of the twenty-
one intrafamilial homicides committed by multiple offenders).
2005]
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Third, a significant correlation exists between the gender of the
offender and the relationship of the offender to the victim. Most girls
rarely kill a stranger, but family members and acquaintances are nearly
equal targets.66 Like girls, boys kill acquaintances nearly half of the
time, but they kill family members less than a quarter as often as girls
do, and their rate of killing strangers is over five times that of girls.67
Overall, the vast majority of juvenile boys kill acquaintances or stran-
gers, not family members. Rowley and his colleagues found, in a study
of 787 juvenile boys, that only eight percent had killed parents or step-
parents, and less than ten percent had killed other family members.68
These data have their roots in adolescent development and the char-
acteristics that set adolescence apart from childhood and adulthood. The
following section explores the most salient of those characteristics.
II. ADOLESCENCE AND THE PRIMACY OF PEERS
Adolescents, by definition, are works in progress. For decades,
social scientists have studied and documented the distinct period of life
called "adolescence." Students of developmental psychology have long
known that adolescents' thought processes undergo a maturation process
that begins in childhood and continues into adulthood. In recent years,
the "hard" sciences have joined their "softer" colleagues, reporting for
the first time scientific evidence of the long maturation process of the
brain 69 that buttresses the work of developmental psychologists. Neu-
rophysiological research reveals that some parts of the brain, notably
those that govern the "executive functions" of the brain, such as risk
assessment, judgment, and decision-making, continue to develop into
the late teens and early twenties.7" Those findings may explain the fact
66. Id. at 9 (7%, strangers; 44%, family members; 49%, acquaintances).
67. Id. (49.20%, acquaintances; 13.83%, family members; and 36.97%, strangers).
68. Id. at 7.
69. See Sarah Durston et al., Anatomical MRI of the Developing Human Brain: What Have
We Learned?, 40 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 1012, 1012 (2001) (reviewing
results of MRI studies of brain development from childhood through adolescence); MICHAEL S.
GAZZANIGA ET AL., COGNITivE NEUROSCIENCE: THE BIOLOGY OF THE MIND 20-21 (2d ed. 2002);
Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic Mapping of Human Cortical Development During Childhood
Through Early Adulthood, 101 PROCEEDINGS NAT'L ACAD. SCIENCE 8174, 8177 (2004) (asserting
that adolescent behavioral immaturity mirrors the anatomical immaturity of their brains);
Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., Development of Cortical and Subcortical Brain Structures in
Childhood and Adolescence: A Structural MRI Study, 44 DEVELOPMENTAL MED. & CHILD
NEUROLOGY 4 (2002) (demonstrating that MRI studies show how a particular brain operates over
time); Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., Mapping Continued Brain Growth and Gray Matter Density
Reduction in Dorsal Frontal Cortex: Inverse Relationships During Postadolescent Brain
Maturation, 21 J. NEUROSCIENCE 8819, 8826 (2001).
70. E.g., DANIEL J. SIEGEL, THE DEVELOPING MIND: TOWARD A NEUROBIOLOGY OF
INTERPERSONAL RESPONSE 10-11 (1999) (discussing the general processes of the developing
mind); Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., In-Vivo Evidence for Post-Adolescent Brain Maturation in
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that, for the most part, the intellectual and social development of today's
sixteen-year-old are no greater than for his ancestor in 1900, even
though the sixteen-year-old of today typically has achieved more in
terms of formal education than his counterpart at the turn of the twenti-
eth century. It is no doubt true, as Zimring has commented, that "[k]ids
have come further, but they have further to go."'"
A number of attributes continue to set even older adolescents apart
from adults.72 For example, a critical life skill that undergoes intensive
development throughout adolescence is the ability to make good deci-
sions. Like most other activities in life, decision-making is a learned
skill that improves with use, and compared to adults, adolescents have
less knowledge and experience to draw on in making decisions. 73 More-
over, adolescents do not think ahead7 ' and are prone to make decisions
based on their preference for short-term results, 75 rather than to look
ahead to long-term consequences.76 Adolescents tend to focus on the
present and to discount risks given great weight by adults, especially
when they are under emotional stress or when there is no obvious solu-
tion to a problem.77 Thus, "[iln situations where adults see several
choices, adolescents may see only one."'78 Similarly, lack of impulse
control is normal in adolescence. Like other traits common to adoles-
cents, however, teenage impulsivity does not predict poor judgment or
psychopathy in adulthood.79 In fact, adolescent offenses that appear to
the casual observer to be calculated acts of revenge are often impulsive
and moralistic in origin.80 In one study, not a single adolescent who was
involved in a shooting could remember deciding to shoot and pulling the
Frontal and Striatal Regions, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 859, 860 (1999); see also GAZZANIGA ET
AL., supra note 69, at 75, 547.
71. FRANKLIN E. ZImRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 19 (1982).
72. E.g., Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence:
Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decisionmaking, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 249, 267 (1996).
73. Elizabeth Scott, Criminal Responsibility in Adolescence: Lessons from Developmental
Psychology, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 294
(Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000).
74. Beyer, supra note 62, at 33.
75. Id. at 33; see also Gerald P. Koocher, Different Lenses: Psycho-Legal Perspectives on
Children's Rights, 16 NOVA L. REV. 711, 716 (1995).
76. Beyer, supra note 62, at 27.
77. Daniel Seagrave & Thomas Grisso, Adolescent Development and the Measurement of
Juvenile Psychopathy, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 219, 229 (2002) (citing S. Small et al.,
Adolescents' Perceptions of the Costs and Benefits of Engaging in Health-Compromising
Behaviors, 22 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 73-87 (1993)); Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 72, at
258-61.
78. Beyer, supra note 62, at 27.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 33 (maintaining that juveniles have a high moral sense and are intolerant of
"anything that seems unfair").
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trigger; instead, they all said that the gun just "went off."'" 1
The effects of another adolescent attribute, susceptibility to peer
influence, however, overshadow other distinguishing characteristics of
adolescence.82 The intensity with which adolescents feel pressure to
conform with their peers exacerbates well-documented features of youth
such as poor decision-making and impulsivity, and often leads adoles-
cents to engage in behaviors they can resist when alone and will nor-
mally desist from as they reach adulthood. As significant as poor
decision-making and youthful impulsivity are on their own, when
accompanied by the powerful peer pressure characteristic of youth, they
can turn a purely innocent event into a newspaper headline in a
heartbeat.83
Adolescence, and male adolescence in particular, is characterized
by the increasing substitution of peer relationships and control for paren-
tal and other familial and organizational influences. 84  Peers dominate
the daily social interaction among adolescents, and teens report that they
"feel most happy, alert, and intrinsically motivated" when in the com-
pany of their peers.85 It is not surprising, then, that "[p]eers are the most
critical audience with whom behaviors are learned, scripted, practiced,
and refined, while peers confer status and identity by serving as arbiters
81. Id. at 27.
82. Social scientists have studied the role of peer influence in adolescent behavior since the
early twentieth century. The most famous theory of peer influence, Sutherland's theory of
differential association, posited that, like all human behavior, criminal behavior is learned from
others. See EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY (4th ed. 1947). In the 1960s,
Robert Burgess and Ronald Akers restated Sutherland's theory in the terminology of behavioral
psychology, applying B.F. Skinner's concept of operant conditioning and its reinforcement system
of perceived rewards and punishments to develop their social learning theory. See Robert Burgess
& Ronald Akers, A Differential Association-Reinforcement Theory of Criminal Behavior, 14 Soc.
PROBLEMS 128 (1966). Other theories, however, have tended to dominate discussions of
adolescent criminality in the succeeding decades. See infra notes 88-96.
83. These observations are not the domain of social scientists alone. Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, writing for the majority in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988),
acknowledged the power of peer influence: "Inexperience, less education, and less intelligence
make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his of her conduct while at the same
time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by emotion or peer pressure than is an adult." Id.
at 835 (ruling that the Constitution prohibits the execution of anyone under the age of sixteen).
84. Reiss, supra note 24, at 150. Although in large part adolescents are attracted to groups of
their peers for social and emotional support, peer relationships may perform totally different
functions. For example, among Latino youth, the almost constant threat of violence and criminal
victimization drives individuals into group membership for protection, even more than for purely
social reasons. Edward Pabon et al., Clarifying Peer Relations and Delinquency, 24 YouTH &
Soc'Y 149, 160 (1992).
85. WARR, supra note 26, at 13 (citing MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI & REED LARSON, BEING
ADOLESCENT: CONFLICT AND GROWTH IN THE TEENAGE YEARS 71 (1984) (accounting in detail
how adolescents in a community outside Chicago spend their waking hours, reporting that teens
spend a full half of the week with peers and that the major competitor for their time was not time
with adults, but time alone)).
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of social behavior. '"86 The compulsion to gain acceptance by peers com-
pounds the already diminished ability of adolescents to make good deci-
sions and to resist negative impulses, and thus creates fertile ground for
group crime. As Zimring notes, "[m]ost adolescent decisions to break
the law or not take place on a social stage, where the immediate pressure
of peers is the real motive for most teenage crime."87
Peer influence over such moral judgments as whether to break the
law may be particularly compelling because adolescence is such a criti-
cal time for moral development.88 Warr comments that as their life
experience increases, young people ordinarily come to be aware of the
intergroup relativism of moral codes. They recognize that what is per-
missible in one group (with their cousins, classmates, church friends, or
Saturday night friends) may not be appropriate in another. The result is
an expanding appreciation of the relativity of standards of conduct.89
A teen may well understand the difference between right and wrong
and may even have developed the ability to keep his impulses in check,
"but resisting temptation while alone is a different task from resisting
the pressure to commit an offense when among adolescent peers who
wish to misbehave." 9 Thus, "a necessary condition for an adolescent to
stay law-abiding is the ability to deflect or resist peer pressure. Many
youths lack this critical skill for a long time."91 Peer conformity plays
such a powerful role in adolescent decision-making that it renders teens
much less able than adults to make decisions that are the product of their
own independent thinking.92
Moreover, the intensity of teenagers' desire for peer approval, cou-
pled with their short-term orientation, causes them to take risks which
adults would anticipate and avoid. For example, teens who carry guns
often do not expect ever to use the gun or to injure anyone. Instead, the
typical gun-toting sixteen-year-old just wants to scare someone or "look
86. Criminalizing Delinquency, supra note 50, at 31 n. 145; see also WARR, supra note 26, at
23-26. Although popular culture generally focuses on peer influence as a negative behavioral
force, peers can also have beneficial effects on adolescent behavior. Id.
87. See ZIMRING, supra note 15, at 78.
88. WARR, supra note 26, at 66.
89. Id. at 66-67 (citation omitted). As youths "realize the moral relativism of the world,
[they] may view it as license to engage in any conduct, and may revel in the opportunity to create,
together with their friends, their own moral universe, one free from the strictures of parents,
school, and other authorities." Id. at 67 (emphasis in original).
90. ZIMRING, supra note 15, at 78.
91. Id.
92. Beyer, supra note 62, at 33; see also Laurence Steinberg & Robert G. Schwartz,
Developmental Psychology Goes to Court, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE
ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 9, 23 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) (describing
adolescence as a "period of tremendous malleability, during which experiences in the family, peer
group, school, and other settings have a great deal of influence over the course of development").
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bigger."93 Working with teens and preteens can drive home the reality
of such youthful thinking. When a slight, underdeveloped twelve-year-
old client of the Juvenile Justice Clinic in which I teach was arrested and
charged with unlawful possession of a gun, he was convincing in his
explanation that he needed the gun to get some "respect" in his neigh-
borhood. Without the gun, he was just a kid, and a small one at that.
With it, at least in his mind, he was a force to be reckoned with.
Even when adolescents offend alone, peer influence can play a sig-
nificant role in the commission of the offense. Many who act alone are
heavily influenced by the attitudes of their peers and the status they
stand to gain (or lose) by engaging in a lone criminal act. Evidence of
this phenomenon can be found in the common recounting of the criminal
behavior, in all its details and perhaps more, to one's friends.94 Indeed,
certain behaviors commonly engaged in by adolescents to impress their
peers either before or after the crime, if exhibited by adults, would pre-
sent a textbook profile of a psychopath.95
Steinberg describes psychopathy as:
actually composed of two related, but independent components. Fac-
tor I reflects a cluster of affective and interpersonal features best
described as callous emotional detachment (e.g., glibness, egocentric-
ity, superficial charm, and shallow affect), whereas Factor II repre-
93. Beyer, supra note 62, at 27.
94. See MARTIN GOLD, DELINQUENT BEHAVIOR IN AN AMERICAN CITY (1970) (reporting that
a sizable proportion of adolescent perpetrators of solo offenses quickly recounted the incident to
their friends).
95. It is important here to distinguish between two similar words with very different
meanings: psychopathy and psychopathology. "Psychopathology refers to any sort of
psychological disorder that causes distress either for the individual or those in the individual's
life." Laurence Steinberg, The Juvenile Psychopath: Fads, Fiction, and Facts, Invited Lecture at
the National Institute for Justice, Perspectives on Crime and Justice, Washington, D.C. 2 (Mar. 20,
2001), at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/187100.pdf. Common forms of psychopathology
include depression, schizophrenia, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and alcohol
dependency. Id. Psychopathy, in contrast, refers to a very specific and distinctive type of
psychopathology. It is "a type of personality disorder defined chiefly by a combination of
antisocial behavior and callousness and emotional detachment." Id. at 3. It includes a pervasive
pattcrn of disregard for and violation of the rights of others, as indicated by three (or more) of the
following: 1) failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by
repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest; 2) deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated
lying, use of aliases, or conning others for personal profit or pleasure; 3) impulsivity or failure to
plan ahead; 4) irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or assaults;
5) reckless disregard for safety of self or others; 6) consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by
repeated failure to sustain consistent work behavior or honor financial obligations; 7) lack of
remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen
from another; 8) an individual at least eighteen years old; 9) evidence of conduct disorder with
onset before age fifteen years; and 10) occurrence of antisocial behavior not exclusively during
the course of schizophrenia or a manic episode. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND




sents the chronic unstable and antisocial lifestyle (e.g.,
irresponsibility, proneness to boredom, impulsivity, and criminality)
associated with psychopathic individuals.
96
Steinberg's Factor I could as aptly describe adolescence as psychopathy.
Parallels between adult psychopathy and transient adolescent develop-
mental characteristics include such behaviors as grandiosity, a lack of
empathy, a lack of guilt or remorse, and a denial of or a refusal to accept
responsibility for one's misdeeds.97 The potential conflation of adult
psychopathy and normative adolescence is complicated further by the
fact that, as adolescents work toward becoming autonomous individuals
and establishing their own unique identities, they may "try on" different
personalities or adopt an oppositional stance toward authority.98 "As a
consequence, an adolescent may present an insincere and seemingly
choreographed social fagade . . . which can be misinterpreted as the
manipulative, false, and shallow features of the psychopathic
offender." 99
Because such behaviors are so common in adolescence, Seagrave
and Grisso sound a caution against misidentifying adolescents as "psy-
chopaths in the making." They warn of the risk of misdiagnosing as
psychopathic "a transient feature of a developmental process that will
96. Steinberg, supra note 95, at 3.
97. Seagrave & Grisso, supra note 77, at 226. The case of Napoleon Beazley is instructive.
Although there was no evidence that Napoleon suffered from any mental disturbance, a
psychologist who testified for the prosecution suggested that he was grandiose, self-indulgent, and
preoccupied with death, all of which can be normal for adolescents. The error in interpreting
Napoleon's adolescent behavior was compounded by the jury's use of that same evidence to find
the aggravating circumstance of future dangerousness. The psychologist had neither interviewed
Napoleon nor reviewed his life history, and he admitted that he based his opinion on statements
made about Napoleon by his co-defendants, the Coleman brothers, statements that they have since
recanted. Texas Execution Information Center, Execution Reports, Napoleon Beazley, at http://
www.txexecutions.org/reports/270.asp (last visited Jan. 22, 2005).
98. Seagrave & Grisso, supra note 77, at 226.
99. Id. But see Paul J. Frick, Juvenile Psychopathy from a Developmental Perspective:
Implications for Construct Development and Use in Forensic Assessments, 26 LAW & HuM.
BEHAV. 247, 248-49 (2002) (questioning Seagrave and Grisso's isolation of psychopathy as
uniquely problematic because of overlap between normative features of adolescence and
psychopathy and arguing that such similarities exist in adolescent psychopathology in general, and
the key is determining what went awry); Stephen D. Hart et al., Commentary on Seagrave and
Grisso: Impressions of the State of the Art, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 241, 242 (2002) (criticizing
Seagrave and Grisso for not going far enough; because psychopathy is a personality disorder and
personality does not crystallize until late adolescence or early adulthood, juvenile psychopathy
may not even exist-citing DSM-IV's requirement that a person be eighteen or older before a
diagnosis of "antisocial personality disorder" is made). Although these critiques may be accurate,
they miss the point. The power of Seagrave and Grisso's observations is that certain behaviors,
while abnormal to the point of psychopathy for adults, are quite normal during the adolescent
years, and that both clinicians and theorists must take great care in distinguishing between the two
so as not to label and treat as abnormal adolescents who are simply acting their age.
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not be characteristic of the youth as he or she reaches adult maturity."'"
The seminal work of Cleckley, which provides the basis for the modem
concept of psychopathy, supports Seagrave and Grisso's concern:
Confused manifestations of revolt or self-expression are, as everyone
knows, more likely to produce unacceptable behavior during child-
hood and adolescence than in adult life. Sometimes persistent traits
and tendencies of this sort and inadequate emotional responses indi-
cate the picture of the psychopath early in his career. Sometimes,
however, the child or the adolescent will for a while behave in a way
that would seem scarcely possible to anyone but the true psychopath
and later will change, becoming a normal and useful member of
society. '
Similarly, although the behavior of many violent juvenile offenders
may appear to be "psychotic," most youths are not.10 2 Instead, they are
simply acting, though badly and even criminally, in the impulsive, peer-
driven ways of youth.
Understanding the primacy of peers does not, however, explain the
connection between peer influence and youth violence. It is to that sub-
ject that we now turn.
100. Seagrave & Grisso, supra note 77, at 224; see also John F. Edens et al., Assessment of
"Juvenile Psychopathy" and Its Association with Violence: A Critical Overview, 19 BEHAV. SCI.
& L. 53, 74-76 (2001). Edens and his colleagues state that:
[t]he chief concern raised by using measures of psychopathy to make weighty
decisions about juveniles is that we fundamentally do not know whether these
measures identify a small subgroup of adolescents who, based on stable personality
traits, will engage persistently in antisocial and violent behavior throughout the
course of their lives.
Id. at 74 (emphasis in original). They cite problems with current assessment instruments,
particularly the possibility that adolescents' scores "may be inflated by normative developmental
characteristics," id. at 75, and the ethical issues which arise with the use of those instruments in
assessing, for example, an individual adolescent's amenability to treatment and future
dangerousness for purposes of making the decision whether to transfer him for trial in adult
criminal court. Id. at 76.
101. Seagrave & Grisso, supra note 77, at 224 (citing HARVEY CLECKLEY, THE MASK OF
SANITY 270 (5th ed. 1976)); see also Gina M. Vincent et al., Subtypes of Adolescent Offenders:
Affective Traits and Antisocial Behavior Patterns, 21 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 695 (2003). The
extension of the adult construct of psychopathy to adolescents is complicated by the questionable
validity of measures used to identify psychopathy in youth. See Jennifer L. Skeem & Elizabeth
Cauffman, Views of the Downward Extension: Comparing the Youth Version of the Psychopathy
Checklist with the Youth Psychopathic Traits Inventory, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 737 (2003).
102. EWING, supra note 58, at 15. But see Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Neuropsychiatric,
Psychoeducational, and Family Characteristics of 14 Juveniles Condemned to Death in the
United States, 145 AM. J. PSYCHiATRY 584, 587 (1988) (reporting results of an in-depth study of
fourteen of the thirty-seven juvenile offenders then on death row, finding serious brain injuries,
psychotic symptoms first appearing in early childhood, and physical and sexual abuse).
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III. PEER INFLUENCE AND YOUTH VIOLENCE
Criminologists and other social scientists have advanced numerous
theories to explain youth violence. 03 Since 1980, however, a psychiat-
ric-psychopathological approach to youth violence has predominated,
and the anecdotal observations of psychiatrists and psychologists work-
ing in a clinical setting comprise the bulk of empirical research on juve-
nile homicide."° The literature, not surprisingly, routinely describes
juveniles who kill as "emotionally disturbed youths from psychologi-
cally troubled families.' 0 5 Other prominent theories, though differently
labeled, likewise stress family dynamics and the effects of such factors
as absent father figures, alcohol or drug abuse in the home, and the
child's early experiences with violence, both violence between parents
and violence against the child by a parent or other adult in the house-
hold. 106 Even the work of "ecological psychologists," who view social
103. Theories abound, and anthologies that purport to survey the field differ, although they
overlap to some degree. Treatment of the issue here does not pretend to be all-inclusive. Rather,
the inclusion of a section on the etiology of youth violence here attempts only to provide the
backdrop for later, more in-depth treatment of issues of group offending among teenagers. See,
e.g., RONALD AKERS, CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORIES (1999) (describing different theories including
deterrence and rational choice, biological and psychological theories, social learning theory, social
bonding and control theories, labeling theory, social disorganization, anomie, and strain theories,
conflict theory, Marxist and critical theories, feminist theories, and integrative theories); DONALD
E. SHOEMAKER, THEORIES OF DELINQUENCY (4th ed. 2000) (describing theories including the
classical school, biological and biosocial explanations, psychological theories, social organization
and anomie, lower-class based theories, interpersonal and situational explanations, control
theories, labeling theory, radical theory, and integrative theories); DELINQUENCY AND CRIME:
CURRENT THEORIES (J. David Hawkins ed., 1996) (describing theories such as sequential
development theory, peer group bonding as a part of social learning theory, "antisocial
personality" development, social development model of antisocial behavior theory, interactional
theory; contextual analysis, and adaptive strategy theory).
104. Rowley et al., supra note 56, at 4.
105. Id.
Nearly all the juvenile killers described in the literature to date have been diagnosed
as suffering from psychiatric conditions, including neuroses, psychoses, personality
disorders, and organic brain syndromes. Their parents have been characterized as
psychologically impaired or inadequate individuals whose marital relationship is
either broken or disintegrating. Family situations have been described as
oppressive, violent, neglectful and/or otherwise lacking in nurturance and support.
Id; see also Lewis et al., supra note 102, at 587.
106. See, e.g., Tony D. Crespi & Sandra A. Rigazio-DiGillo, Adolescent Homicide and Family
Pathology: Implications for Research and Treatment with Adolescents, 31 ADOLESCENCE 353
(1996) (reporting a variety of factors shared by many extremely violent children, including those
who kill: history of abuse in childhood; absent, non-nurturing, or passive father figures; dominant,
overprotective, or seductive mothers; violence in the home; experience by child of deep sense of
abandonment and distrust; unstable and tumultuous family environment; and possible fear by
mother of her children); Robert Zagar et al., Homicidal Adolescents: A Replication, 67 PSYCHOL.
REP. 1235 (1991) (reporting on research findings that a boy's chances of committing murder are
twice as high if he has any of four risk factors: history of family violence, history of being abused,
gang membership, and alcohol or drug abuse; the odds triple with the presence of any of four
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context, including both familial and extra-familial environments, as the
most significant influence on human development,10 7 bears a marked
similarity, in application, to the psychiatric-psychopathological approach
to youth violence. For example, in his work with violent youth incarcer-
ated in an upstate New York juvenile facility, ecological psychologist
James Garbarino concluded that the principal progenitors of teenage vio-
lence were abandonment by the boys' parents and the shame associated
with it. 18
While each of these theories has certain descriptive and predictive
utility, none has a solid grounding in empirical data.0 9 In contrast, solid
empirical research, conducted over nearly a century, demonstrates that
teen violence is peer group behavior.110 Why the fact of adolescent
group criminality, well known to all criminologists,"' has failed to cap-
additional factors: weapon use, previous arrest, neurological problems impairing thinking and
feeling, and difficulties at school; in assessing risk, the odds increase in direct proportion to the
number of factors present).
107. E.g., URIE BRONFENBRENNER, THE ECOLOGY OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: EXPERIMENTS
BY NATURE AND DESIGN 6-8 (1979). Bronfenbrenner is widely regarded as the father of
"ecological psychology," a branch of social context theory which posits that interactions with
others and the various environments in which individuals live (such as home, school, work, peer
group) are central to individual human development. See Fractal Domains, Developmental
Psychology: An Introduction, Urie Bronfenbrenner, at http://www.fractaldomains.com/devpsych/
bronfenbrenner.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2005). All things being equal, the more compatible the
relationship between the different environments, the more smoothly the development from
childhood to adolescence, adolescence to adulthood, and so on, is likely to occur. Thus,
adolescents whose parents' expectations differ markedly from their peers or co-workers can be
expected to engage in more destructive and antisocial behaviors than their counterparts with
highly compatible cross-environmental expectations. BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 107, at 6-8.
108. JAMES GARBARINO, LOST BoYs: WHY OUR SONS TURN VIOLENT AND How WE CAN
SAVE THEM 49 (1999) ("Deliberate abandonment evokes in boys a deep shame.... The shame of
abandonment appears over and over again in the lives of kids who kill. Boys feel the shame of
rejection."). "To these boys and their peers, their acts often do make moral sense. Or perhaps
they don't see their acts as either moral or immoral at all but, rather, as necessary for survival, or
as simple entitlements." Id. at 121.
Much more common than truly amoral boys are boys within whom a stunted or
otherwise troubled emotional life combines with a narrow and intense personal need
for justice. These impulses come to dominate a boy's moral thinking to the
exclusion of all other considerations, such as social conventions about right and
wrong, consequences, empathy, and even personal survival. . . . When boys kill,
they are seeking justice - as they see it, through their eyes. What makes these acts
appear senseless to us is often the fact that we either don't see the connection
between the original injustice and the eventual lethal act or don't understand why
the boy perceived injustice in the first place.
Id. at 128 (emphasis in original). "Many of the acts of lethal violence committed by boys are
deliberate and sometimes even meticulously planned, rather than spur-or-the-moment explosions
of rage. I think this is significant, because it highlights the importance of understanding that boys
think about violence as a solution to their problems." Id. at 132.
109. Rowley et al., supra note 56, at 3-10.
110. See supra notes 37-57 and accompanying text.
111. WARR, supra note 26, at 3. Warr notes, too, that the general public, seems to be well
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ture their attention is, as Zimring intimated, a mystery.' 12 That aside, it
remains true that, as Warr observed in 2002, "the single strongest pre-
dictor of criminal behavior known to criminologists is the number of
delinquent friends an individual has."' Precisely how peer group
influence operates to encourage antisocial and criminal conduct is not
well understood; however, sociologists have offered several explana-
tions of the distinct mechanisms that work, independently or together, to
encourage criminal behavior,' particularly fear of ridicule, loyalty, and
status. " 5
Fear of ridicule among adolescents, for whom ridicule is such a
commonplace form of communication, is particularly potent.
To risk ridicule is to risk expulsion from or abandonment by the
group, or to place in danger one's legitimate claim to be a member of
the group. To lose the group is to lose the identity and sometimes the
prestige that it creates, as well as the sense of belonging it affords.1 16
Empirical studies reveal the power of ridicule as a mechanism for pro-
moting antisocial behavior. In one study, the reaction of one's peers was
by far the most frequently cited consequence of rejecting an invitation to
engage in risky behaviors such as smoking marijuana and driving under
the influence.11 7 This and other studies demonstrate the additional phe-
nomenon that avoiding ridicule is generally a much stronger motivator
among teens than gaining approval: Adolescents do not necessarily con-
aware of the social nature of crime. One of the most powerful signals prompting fear of crime in
everyday life is the sight of a group of young males, and the idea of peer influence as a cause of
crime seems to be well entrenched in the folklore of crime. Id. (emphasis in original) (citation
omitted).
112. The authors of one of the most influential recent treatises on criminology reject out of
hand the peer influence theory and instead attribute teenage criminality to the inability to exercise
self-control. See MICHAEL R. GOTrFREDSON & TRAvis HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME
(1990). Warr notes how odd Gottfredson and Hirschi's reaction is considering that "one of the
principal ways by which groups seem to affect individuals is precisely by dissolving their self-
control." WARR, supra note 26, at 119 (emphasis in original). However, Warr does suggest that
an explanation for the persistent contentiousness concerning peer explanations of delinquency
may be the indirect nature of most evidence supporting them. Id. at 120 ("[E]xisting evidence on
peer influence is largely correlational and often highly inferential, facts that leave room for
legitimate questions about causal direction, selection effects, and other alternative explanations.").
But see Rowley et al., supra note 56, at 7, 9.
113. WARR, supra note 26, at 3.
114. See generally id. at 46-58.
115. Id. at 55.
116. Id. at 46; see also Ruth Beyth-Marom et al., Perceived Consequences of Risky Behaviors:
Adults and Adolescents, 29 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 549 (1993).
117. Beyth-Marom et al., supra note 116, at 560. Across situations, reaction of peers was the
most frequently cited consequence of rejecting a risky behavior for eighty to one hundred percent
of the respondents ("they'll call me a nerd; they'll get mad at me"). Id. at 560.
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form so as to be liked more; they conform to avoid rejection." 8 Particu-
larly among adolescent males, ridicule is the single most common
method of dominance, far outpacing threats, physical contact, and direct
commands." 9 Warr concludes that "if maintaining [one's] identity
entails an occasional foray onto the other side of the law to avoid rejec-
tion, it may seem a small price to pay to maintain such a valuable
possession."' 2°
Loyalty to friends also figures significantly in adolescent criminal
behavior. Because teenage friendships are the first efforts to establish an
identity outside the family core, they typically require greater formality
and clarity than relationships formed later in life. 121 Thus, when adoles-
cents describe what they mean by "friendship," they typically place
great importance on loyalty and trustworthiness; a friend is someone
who will not talk about you or betray you behind your back. 122 To teens
who engage in illegal behavior, "loyalty means much more than not rat-
ting on your friend(s). It often means engaging in risky or illegal behav-
ior in which one would not otherwise participate in order to preserve or
solidify a friendship."' 123 It is not surprising, then, that adolescents are
much more likely to lie to the police to protect a friend than are older or
younger suspects.' 2 4 Indeed, loyalty often acts as a sort of "moral
cover" for criminal conduct by "impart[ing] legitimacy to otherwise ille-
gitimate acts and confer[ring] honor on the dishonorable."' 125
Closely related to loyalty and fear of ridicule is status within one's
group.126 Status hierarchies form rapidly, as demonstrated by a study of
a group of teenage boys randomly assigned to cabins at a summer camp;
within hours, contests over status had ceased and a stable hierarchy was
in place. 27 The alpha male was in charge, and even such minor contests
118. CHARLES A. KIESLER & SARA B. KIESLER, CONFORMITY 43 (1969); see also Beyth
Marom, supra note 116, at 560.
119. RITCH C. SAVIN-WILLIAMS, ADOLESCENCE: AN ETHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (1987); see
also Donna Eder & Stephanie Sanford, The Development and Maintenance of Interactional Norms
Among Early Adolescents, in I SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT 283 (Patricia A.
Adler & Peter Adler eds., 1986).
120. WARR, supra note 26, at 49.
121. Id. at 50.
122. Ritch C. Savin-Williams & Thomas J. Berndt, Friendship and Peer Relations, in AT THE
THRESHOLD: THE DEVELOPING ADOLESCENT 277 (S. Shirley Feldman & Glen R. Elliott eds.,
1990); see also John C. Coleman, Friendship and Peer Group in Adolescence, in HANDBOOK OF
ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY (Joseph Adelson ed., 1980).
123. WARR, supra note 26, at 50.
124. Mark Warr, Age, Peers, and Delinquency, 72 Soc. FORCES 247 (1993).
125. WARR, supra note 26, at 51.
126. Id.
127. SAVIN-WILLIAMS, supra note 119, at 51-79 (studying four cabins the first night to see who
would become the cabin "leader"); see also John M. Levine & Richard L. Moreland, Progress in
Small Group Research, 41 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 585 (1990).
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as who would get to sleep closest to him were resolved. 128 Once one is
in a group with an established status, avoiding loss of status becomes a
primary objective. 129 In the inner city world of many minority youth,
status may be the only "possession" an individual owns. 130  Because
respect and status are of such profound importance, "something
extremely valuable is at stake in every interaction," 131 and even unin-
tended or merely perceived slights can provoke immediate violence and
death. 132
There is a generalized sense that very little respect is to be had, and
therefore everyone competes to get what affirmation he can of the
little that is available .... Many inner-city young men in particular
crave respect to such a degree that they will risk their lives to attain
and maintain it. 133
The interplay of ridicule avoidance, loyalty, and status among peers
illustrates the social utility of "bad" behavior.' 34 Loyalty and fear of
ridicule are sufficiently potent compliance mechanisms to coerce other-
wise law-abiding teens to participate in risky, dangerous, and even crim-
inal conduct that they would otherwise not engage in alone. 135
Moreover, attaining status or averting a threat to an already high status
go beyond engendering conformity to engaging in bad behavior, and
often are themselves the direct provocation for violence to "save face,"
particularly when disputes occur in the presence of others. 136 As Zimr-
ing has observed, "[t]he immediate motive for criminal involvement is
group standing. The participant is showing off, living up to group
expectations, pressing to avoid being ridiculed"'' by his peers, whose
opinion he values above all else.
Thus, even a teenager who offends alone does not necessarily act
128. SAVIN-WILLIAMS, supra note 119, at 51-79.
129. Bernard P. Cohen & Steven D. Silver, Group Structure and Information Exchange:
Introduction to a Theory, in SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF PROGRESS: NEW FORMULATIONS 160
(Berger et al. eds., 1989); Lisa Troyer & C. Wesley Younts, Whose Expectations Matter? The
Relative Power of First- and Second-Order Expectations in Determining Social Influence, 103
AM. J. Soc. 692 (1997).
130. WARR, supra note 26, at 53 (citing Elijah Anderson, The Code of the Streets, 273
ATLANTIC MONTHLY 81, 82, 89 (1994) (Anderson's study focused on social relations among
African-American young men)); see also ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET: DECENCY,
VIOLENCE, AND THE MORAL LIFE OF THE INNER CITY (1999).
131. Anderson, supra note 130, at 92.
132. WARR, supra note 26, at 53.
133. Anderson, supra note 130, at 89.
134. Criminalizing Delinquency, supra note 50, at 31.
135. WARR, supra note 26, at 55; see also Warr, supra note 43.
136. WARR, supra note 26, at 56; see also Richard B. Felson, Predatory and Dispute-Related
Violence: A Social Interactionist Perspective, in ROUTINE ACTIVITY AND RATIONAL CHOICE:
ADVANCES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 103 (Ronald V. Clarke & Marcus Felson eds., 1993).
137. ZMRING, supra note 15, at 30.
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independently of his peers. Though alone, he is not free of the potential
for ridicule or a change in status as a result of his conduct, which his
peers will learn of whether he wishes them to or not.1 38 More than any
other factors, a teenage boy's group status and individual standing
among his peers stand out as the principal motivations for teenage
involvement in criminal behavior.13
9
Empirical research underscores this point. In their study of the
relationship between engaging in delinquent behavior and having delin-
quent friends, Elliott and Menard found that, in a majority of cases of
minor acts of delinquency, exposure to delinquent peers preceded the
onset of delinquent behavior. 40 For more serious forms of delinquency,
they found the developmental sequence of "friends first, behavior later"
in nearly all cases where they could determine which came first.'41
Based on those findings, Elliott and Menard concluded that "[h]aving
delinquent friends and being involved in delinquent behavior may influ-
ence one another, but the influence is not symmetric."14 Instead, "the
influence of exposure [to delinquent friends] on delinquency begins ear-
lier in the sequence, and remains stronger throughout the sequence, than
the influence of delinquency on exposure." 14 3 In an earlier study of
delinquent and non-delinquent peer groups, Morash reached similar con-
clusions."' She found that each boy's own rate of delinquency was
directly related to the delinquency rate of his peers. 4 5 Boys who
belonged to peer groups that engaged in little or no delinquency exhib-
ited little or no delinquency, while boys with peers who had high indi-
vidual rates of delinquency also demonstrated high rates of
delinquency. 146
The influence of one's peers on delinquent and criminal conduct
138. See WARR, supra note 26, at 7. Warr thus comments that peer influence and group
delinquency "are not necessarily analogous concepts ... [although] the sets of associates specified
by these two concepts are far from mutually exclusive." Id. at 7-8.
139. See id. at 40-44. After surveying the literature in support of the peer influence theory,
Warr comments that, despite the absence of any study failing to show a significant effect of peers
on current or subsequent delinquency, "the question of causal direction remains a contentious
issue in criminology today." Id. at 42. Warr explains that the reason for this continuing debate is
that the question places two major theoretical traditions in criminology (control theory and
differential association theory) head-to-head. Id.
140. Elliott & Menard, supra note 18, at 61; see also Ross L. Matsueda & Kathleen Anderson,
The Dynamics of Delinquent Peers and Delinquent Behavior, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 269 (1998); Ross
L. Matsueda, The Current State of Differential Association Theory, 34 CRIaM & DELINQ. 277
(1988).
141. Elliott & Menard, supra note 18, at 61.
142. Id. at 63.
143. Id.
144. Morash, supra note 29, at 309.




may explain the increasing acceptance of a relatively new theory of vio-
lent youth crime, the theory that the high rates of such crime among
teens are purely "transitory phenomena associated with a transitional
status and life period." '1 47 Under this theory, interventions to minimize
antisocial teen behavior and to rehabilitate juvenile offenders are unnec-
essary because the conduct to be corrected naturally tapers off as adoles-
cents mature and become adults assuming the roles and status
appropriate to adults in our society.' 4 8
[W]hereas the early juvenile court assumed that some correction was
needed to redirect adolescents away from criminality and into pro-
social adult behaviors, modem developmental theory suggests that
the cessation of delinquency itself is a normative process, regardless
of the actions taken by a juvenile court or any other social
institution. 149
Hard data support this "aging out of delinquency" theory. Federal
Bureau of Investigation statistics reveal that rates of participation in vio-
lence are much higher among adolescent males than for males of any
other age, that sixteen- to nineteen-year-olds engage in the highest rates
of violence, and that a high percentage of males participate in violence
at some time during their youth. 150 "If a male will ever be involved in
violence, adolescence is when it will happen. A corollary is that the
majority of those who do participate in violence during adolescence do
not report violent behavior later on in adulthood."'' Zimring concludes
from the FBI and other data that the "social settings and pressures of
adolescence thus create the high-water mark for the involvement of oth-
erwise normal boys in violent conflict." '52
Chief among those adolescent pressures is the influence of peers.
In a study that pooled data from five consecutive annual waves of the
National Youth Survey, Warr concluded that "the age distribution of
147. Delbert Elliott, Serious Violent Offenders: Onset, Developmental Course, and
Termination, The American Society of Criminology 1993 Presidential Address, 32 CRIMINOLOGY
1 (1994); see also Terrie E. Moffitt, Adolescent-Limited and Life-Course Persistent Behavior: A
Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 674 (1993).
148. ZIMRING, supra note 15, at 82; see also MARVIN E. WOLFGANG ET AL., DELINQUENCY IN A
BIRTH COHORT (1972) (recognizing that while a sizeable number of juveniles engage in delinquent
activities, many stop fairly early in their teens, without any intervention to deter them).
149. Criminalizing Delinquency, supra note 50, at 30 (citing Moffitt, supra note 147); Daniel
Nagin et al., Life Course Trajectories of Different Types of Offenders, 33 CRIMINOLOGY I 11
(1995); John H. Laub & Robert J. Sampson, Understanding Desistance from Crime, 28 CRIME &
JUSTICE 1 (2001) (discussing the processes and factors underlying desistance from criminal
behavior).
150. ZIMRING, supra note 15, at 27. See id. at 18-30 (presenting charts and description of
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crime stems primarily from age-related changes in peer relations,
changes that are part of the ordinary developmental process that takes
place during adolescence."1 53 To be sure, peer influence is not the sole
cause of adolescent crime. The evidence, however, supports the conclu-
sion that peer influence is its "principal proximate cause." '154
As adolescents become adults, the peer groups of their youth are
supplanted by marriage, full-time work, and the other activities of adult-
hood. At the same time, given the increasing psychological and emo-
tional autonomy that comes with age, older adolescents are more able to
detach from their peers and resist the once overriding pressure to follow
them.' 55 The remarks of one nineteen-year-old research subject are
illustrative:
Two years ago if they had bothered me I wouldn't have told them to
leave me alone; now if they bug me I tell them to go somewhere....
I'd rather be alone than with my friends, cause they always want you
to do things and I'd rather do what I want to do. 156
Rarely will "doing what I want to do" alone as a young adult entail
engaging in the risky and criminal behaviors of youth. As reported
above, evidence that most teenage offenders never offend after gaining
adult status is beyond dispute.
The "aging out of delinquency" theory is not necessarily good news
for those caught up in youth crime, however. Many of those teens will
never have the opportunity to "age out" of their youthful involvement in
crime because of the vast gulf between the social sciences and the crimi-
nal justice system in its understanding of and responses to adolescent
crime. The following sections of this article attempt a bridge across that
gap. Curious about the effect of peer influence and group dynamics on
violent juvenile crime, I set out to study juvenile offenders on death row,
a group that now numbers seventy-two.' 57 The following presents, first,
a short history of the juvenile death penalty, and then, specific findings
concerning the juvenile offenders now on death row.
153. WARR, supra note 26, at 99 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 93-99 (describing the
findings from Warr's 1993 study); see Mark Warr, Age, Peers, and Delinquency, 31
CRIMINOLOGY 17 (1993). In a later study, Warr further concluded that marriage, by disrupting and
even dissolving peer relationships, was a life course change critical to desistance from crime.
Mark Warr, Life Course Transitions and Desistance from Crime, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 183 (1998).
See also generally ROBERT SAMPSON & JOHN LAUB, CRIME IN THE MAKING: PATHWAYS AND
TURNING POINTS IN LIF'E (1993) (adopting and advocating use of a life-course perspective in
analyzing age and its relationship to crime).
154. WARR, supra note 26, at 136.
155. MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI & REED LARSON, BEING ADOLESCENT: CONFLICT AND
GROWTH IN THE TEENAGE YEARS 275 (1984).
156. Id.
157. See STRIEB, supra note 10, at 3.
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IV. THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY
A. A Brief History of the Juvenile Death Penalty
The practice of executing youthful offenders in the United States
dates back to 1647, when sixteen-year-old Thomas Graunger of Plym-
outh Colony was hanged for bestiality with a cow and a horse.' 58
Although the preferred method of dealing with children's crimes was for
their parents to "beat the devil" out of them, the colonial courts could
require parents to publicly execute or even banish children found crimi-
nally liable.1 59 From the colonial era to the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, the law treated juveniles over the age of fourteen
who were criminally accused the same as adults, 160 including eligibility
for the death penalty.16" ' Trials and executions of juveniles continued
throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in much the same
fashion as for adults.'62 Since Graunger's public hanging, another 366
juvenile offenders have been executed,' 63 174 of them before 1930."
The creation of the first juvenile court in Chicago in 1899, followed
in short order by every state, 65 commenced a new era in which a juve-
nile justice system would exist alongside, but separate from, the criminal
justice system. In the juvenile justice system, minors accused of crimi-
nal conduct were to be treated differently from adults because of their
youth, so as to achieve the juvenile court's therapeutic aims of rehabili-
tation and treatment. 66 From the beginning, however, procedures were
158. VICTOR L. STREIB, DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILES 73 (1987). Capital punishment was a
part of American culture even before the country was founded. James R. Acker et al.,
Introduction: America's Experiment with Capital Punishment, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 5 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 1998). The earliest confirmed execution was
carried out in 1608 in colonial Virginia. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 2 (R.
Coyne & L. Entzeroth eds., 1994).
159. Mary E. Spring, Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile Prosecution: A New Approach to the
Problem of Juvenile Delinquency in Illinois, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1351, 1354-55 (1998).
160. See Mary Berkheiser, The Fiction of Juvenile Right to Counsel: Waiver in the Juvenile
Courts, 54 FLA. L. REV. 577, 586 (2002) (citing I BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 463-64 (George Sharswood ed., 1871)).
161. Warren Kato, The Juvenile Death Penalty, 18 J. JUV. L. 112, 113-14 (1997).
162. David Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile Courts in the Early Twentieth Century:
Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 42 (Margaret
K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002).
163. STREIB, supra note 10, at 3.
164. Curtis A. Bradley, The Juvenile Death Penalty and International Law, 52 DUKE L.J. 485,
493 (2002).
165. Tanenhaus, supra note 162, at 45. By 1925, all states, except Maine and Wyoming, had
established juvenile courts. By 1945, every jurisdiction in the nation, including the federal
government, had some type of juvenile court. Charles W. Thomas & Shay Bilchik, Criminal Law:
Prosecuting Juveniles in Criminal Court: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 76 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 439, 451 (1985).
166. See Berkheiser, supra note 160, at 582-87.
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put in place for juveniles who committed certain crimes to be "tried as
adults" in criminal court, where therapeutic considerations have little or
no impact on adjudicative and sentencing determinations.'67 As a con-
sequence, juveniles have continued to be sentenced to death and, as
recently as 1944, to be executed as young as fourteen years of age.168
B. The Juvenile Death Penalty Today
During the current death penalty era, which began in 1972 with
Furman v. Georgia,69 a total of 227 juveniles have received death
sentences.170  Over half of those are in the states of Alabama, Florida,
and Texas.17' Seventy-two remain on death row today.1 72 Twenty-two
have been executed, thirteen in Texas alone. 73 In the remaining 133
cases, the courts have either reversed the conviction and death sentence
or commuted the death penalty to a life sentence. 174 Since the inception
of the research and compilation of the database for this article, four juve-
nile offenders have been executed. 75 During that same time, sixteen
cases were reversed on appeal-of those, one juvenile offender was
167. See ZIMRING, supra note 15, at 132.
The transfer of juveniles is often described as a decision to "try this defendant as an
adult." But if the defendant is 15 years old and of slightly subnormal intelligence,
to try and punish him as if he were adult in all respects is a dangerously
counterfactual enterprise.
... [T]o try an accused as an adult in a criminal court changes only the location of
the hearing; it does not change the characteristics of the defendant.
Id.
168. Lyn Riddle, Five Inmates on Death Row Committed Their Crimes at 16 or 17, THE
GREENVILLE NEWS (Greenville, S.C.), April 2, 2001, at IA (reporting that the youngest person
ever executed in the United States was fourteen at the time of his execution, and his feet did not
even reach the floor from the electric chair in which he sat).
169. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Furman invalidated the death penalty statutes
in thirty-eight states and under federal law because the unlimited jury discretion found in those
laws violated the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 240.
Four years later, the Court upheld the revised death penalty statutes of the states of Georgia,
Texas, and Florida based on their specific procedural protections. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). During
the same term, the Court rejected as unconstitutional the death penalty statutes of North Carolina
and Louisiana. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S.
325 (1976).
170. STREIB, supra note 10, at 3.
171. STREIB, supra note 10, at 10 (fifty-seven in Texas, thirty-two in Florida, and twenty-five
in Alabama).
172. SIEla, supra note 10, at 1I. There are twenty-eight in Texas; fourteen in Alabama; five
each in Mississippi and North Carolina; four each in Arizona and Louisiana; three each in Florida
and South Carolina; two each in Pennsylvania and Georgia; and one each in Nevada and Virginia.
Id. at 24-29.
173. STREIB, supra note 10, at 4.
174. Id. at 3.
175. Id. at 4 (Napoleon Beazley, executed May 28, 2002; T.J. Jones, executed August 8, 2002;
Toronto Patterson, executed August 28, 2002; and Scott Allen Hain, executed April 3, 2003).
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acquitted at a new trial-' 7 6 and the remaining fifteen have received life
sentences through new sentencing hearings or commutations or are
awaiting resentencing.
77
The Supreme Court's decision in early 2004 to review the death
sentence of Christopher Simmons may signal the beginning of the end of
the juvenile death penalty. After the Court's spring 2002 rulings in
Atkins v. Virginia178 and Ring v. Arizona,179 juvenile death penalty
expert Victor Streib suggested, "these may be the last days of the juve-
nile death penalty in America." 8° With four Justices on the United
States Supreme Court calling for reconsideration of the conclusion in
Stanford, that executing sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds is not pro-
scribed by the Constitution,'' the Court may be poised to take that
step. 1 82 But such action, though long overdue, does not yet bear the
mark of inevitability.
Nineteen of the forty jurisdictions in the United States that permit
176. Larry Osborne, of Kentucky, was acquitted on August 1, 2002, at his second trial.
Canadian Coalition Against the Death Penalty, Larry Has Been Exonerated and is Now a Free
Man, at http://www.ccadp.org/larryosborne.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2005).
177. See SaREIB, supra note 10, at 18-32 (Ronald Lee Bell, Jr., Florida, resentenced to life in
2002; David Blue, Mississippi, resentenced to life in 2003; Taurus Carroll, Alabama, resentenced
to life in 2002; Adam Comeaux, Louisiana, resentenced to life in 2003; James Edward Davolt,
Arizona, resentenced to life in 2004; Derrick Harvey, Pennsylvania, resentenced to life in 2002;
Christopher "Bo" Huerstel, Arizona, resentenced to life in 2003; Ryan Matthews, Louisiana,
reversed in 2004; Antonio Richardson, Missouri, resentenced to life in 2003; Rossiny St. Clair,
Florida, resentenced to life in 2002; Simmons, Missouri, reversed in 2003; Kevin Stanford,
Kentucky, granted clemency in 2003; Francisco Edgar Tirado, reversed in 2004, awaiting
resentencing; Alexander Williams, Georgia, commuted in 2002; Corey Williams, Louisiana,
reversed in 2004).
178. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (ruling that the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment prohibits execution of the mentally retarded).
179. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (ruling that the Sixth Amendment requires jurors,
not judges, to decide facts related to capital sentencing).
180. STREIB, supra note 10, at 14; see also Victor L. Streib, Executing Juvenile Offenders: The
Ultimate Denial of Justice, 13 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 121, 134-35 (2003) (calling for abolition of
juvenile death penalty in light of Atkins).
181. See Patterson v. Texas, 536 U.S. 984 (2002) (denial of stay of execution) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (reiterating his agreement with Justice Brennan's dissent in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492
U.S. 361, 382 (1989), that the juvenile death penalty violates the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments); id. (Ginsberg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (calling for re-examination of the
juvenile death penalty in light of Atkins, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), which held unconstitutional the
execution of the mentally retarded); see also In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968, 971 (2002) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (Ginsberg, Breyer, and Souter, JJ. joining) (calling the juvenile death penalty "a relic
of the past" and "inconsistent with evolving standards of decency in a civilized society").
182. Justice O'Connor appears the most likely fifth vote for abolition, given her out-
spokenness against executing the innocent, her call for minimum standards for capital defense
counsel and the resources necessary for an adequate defense, and her remark to women lawyers in
Minnesota, a non-death penalty state, when she said, "[y]ou must breathe a sigh of relief every
day." FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 172, 178
(2003).
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the death penalty still allow execution of those under eighteen. 83 Over
the last decade, the United States has executed more juveniles than all
the combined nations in the world.' 84 In continuing to execute youthful
offenders, the United States joins the company of China, Democratic
Republic of Congo, Iran, and Pakistan. 85 Why we as a society remain
ready to execute those who are not even old enough to see an R-rated
movie, sign a lease, or buy a car is a question far beyond the scope of
this paper, but it is one we must not abandon. The stark reality of apply-
ing the death penalty to juveniles is that we are needlessly killing our
young. Most of the juveniles on death row (or already executed) never
would have offended again; even among the most serious violent juve-
nile offenders, fewer than twenty percent are rearrested for a second
violent offense. 186 Such high levels of desistance would seem to provide
a justification for sanctions far less drastic than the death penalty, 87 but
fear has overwhelmed reason in the formation of policy concerning vio-
lent youthful offenders.
This country has a long history of ambivalence toward adolescence.
Our public policy and laws continue to vacillate between protecting and
condemning our youth and are, at times, schizophrenic.' 88 But, perhaps
it is by "diving into the wreck"' 89 of our youth policy that we can begin
to find understanding. What we can learn from the young men awaiting
execution for the crimes of their youth may yet guide us out of the
wreck. It is to those young men that we now turn.
V. JUVENILE OFFENDERS ON DEATH Row
A. Introduction
Post-Furman, a central tenet of death penalty jurisdiction is that
death, the harshest of all penalties, should be reserved for the "worst of
183. STREa, supra note 10, at 7 (fourteen states set sixteen as the minimum age; the remaining
five set the minimum at seventeen). There is a growing trend in state legislatures to raise the
minimum age to eighteen. Id. at 7. In 1999, Montana raised its minimum age to eighteen, and
Indiana followed in 2002. Id. In March 2004, both South Dakota and Wyoming raised their
minimum age to eighteen. Several other states have bills pending in their legislatures. Id.
184. The International Justice Project, Juveniles, Introduction, at http://www.
intemationaljusticeproject.org/juveniles (last visited Jan. 22, 2005).
185. Id.
186. Howard N. Snyder, Serious, Violent, and Chronic Juvenile Offenders: An Assessment of
the Extent and Trends in Officially-Recognized Serious Criminal Behavior in a Delinquent
Population, in SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE OFFENDERS: RISK FACTORS AND SUCCESSFUL
INTERVENTIONS (Rolf Loeber & David Farrington eds., 1998).
187. ZIMRING, supra note 15, at 166.
188. CHARLES SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 313 (1978).
189. ADRIENNE RICH, DIVING rro THE WRECK: POEMS 1971-72, at 23 (1973) ("I came to see
the damage that was done/and the treasures that prevailed/... the thing I came for:/the wreck and
not the story of the wreck/the thing itself and not the myth.").
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the worst" among those convicted of violent crimes. 9° Applying the
phrase "worst of the worst" to even the most violent juvenile offenders
is oxymoronic, even though it is true that the crimes underlying the sev-
enty-two current juvenile death sentences were horrible. Each one
resulted in the death of at least one person. Often, these were brutal
murders of childen, elderly people, and other hapless victims of random
and senseless acts of violence. That said, executing the seventy-two
youthful offenders on death row will not protect society from "the worst
of the worst." All murder is horrible, but we do not execute all those
convicted of murder. Indeed, review of the seventy-two juveniles on
death row leaves one with the disquieting conclusion that many of the
worst offenders remain on the streets or will return there again soon,
after they are paroled from life sentences or lesser terms of years.
If what the social scientists tell us about adolescents is true for
those sentenced to death as juveniles, we would expect to find among
them certain characteristics. First, we would expect them to be male and
to have been convicted of crimes committed with their friends, though
generally not in organized gangs. Second, we would expect that peer
influence, manifested as loyalty, status seeking, or fear of ridicule, fea-
tured prominently in the commission of the crimes underlying the death
sentences. Third, we would expect to find that few of the victims were
family members, and that the vast majority were either acquaintances or
strangers. Finally, we would expect to learn that the murders were unan-
ticipated, more often than not the outcome of a robbery or other property
crime gone bad. As the following discussion demonstrates, the cases,
for the most part, confirm those expectations.
B. Gender and Group Offending
All seventy-two juvenile offenders on death row are male.19 Dur-
ing the current death penalty era, only five female juveniles have
received death sentences, 192 and none have been executed. 193
190. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See Carol M. Steiker & Jordan Steiker, Judicial
Developments in Capital Punishment Law, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 57 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 1998). See generally Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S.
420, 433 (1980) (reversing death penalty in case in which defendant's murder of his wife and
mother in law could not "be said to have reflected a consciousness materially more 'depraved'
than that of any person guilty of murder.... There is no principled way to distinguish this case, in
which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which it was not.").
191. STREIB, supra note 10, at 11.
192. id. (two in Alabama and one each in Georgia, Indiana, and Mississippi).
193. Id. at 16-18. Four of the death sentences were reversed (Debra Bracewell, Alabama,
1981, id. at 16; Attina Cannaday, Mississippi, 1984, id. at 17; Paula R. Cooper, Indiana, 1989, id.
at 31; and Janice Buttrum, Georgia, 1989, id. at 16), and one was commuted to life in prison
(Judith Neelley, Alabama, 1999, id. at 17).
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Of the seventy-two juvenile offenders on death row, forty-six, or
nearly two-thirds, were convicted of crimes involving multiple offend-
ers. 194 This proportion mirrors that reported in the 1973 National Crime
Panel and is comparable to other studies in the 1970s through the 1990s,
as discussed above. 95 As in those earlier studies, most of the juvenile
offenders on death row were not convicted of participating in gang or
large group criminal activities. Nearly seventy percent (thirty-one of
forty-six) were arrested with one (eighteen) or two (thirteen) of their
friends.19 6 Less than twenty-five percent (eleven of forty-six) were
involved in gang-related incidents, and although gangs account for two
of the three largest multiple offender groups (seven and nine participants
in addition to the defendant), even gang-related crimes generally
involved a smaller two or three person group.
19 7
Even among the twenty-six who acted alone,' 98 the nature of the
crimes indicates that, in more than one-third of the cases (ten), others
were involved in instigating or otherwise affecting the conduct of the
sole actor.' 99 One such case involved a local drug dealer who coyly led
Justin Wiley Dickens into committing a robbery to pay off a debt.2"
The drug dealer, Dallas Moore, had accused Dickens, whom others
called a coward and appropriately nicknamed "Chicken Dickens," 0' of
stealing Moore's cocaine. Moore first told Dickens that he should
recover some of the money by performing "some act" and then pro-
ceeded to tell Dickens about a burglary Moore had committed.20 2 The
next day Dickens told his friends he was going to rob a store in order to
"make it right" with Moore.2 °3 During the burglary of a jewelry store,
Dickens shot and killed a customer.2"
Another instance of likely peer influence occurred as Geno
194. App. A. This article assumes neither guilt nor innocence, but bases its analysis on
information obtained through extensive research derived from sources, including interviews with
attorneys, newspaper articles, the Internet, published cases, and court records.
195. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
196. App. A (six had three accomplices; four had four; two each had five and seven; and one
had nine).
197. App. A. Two defendants were involved with seven additional gang members, for a total
of eight (Efrian Perez and Raul Omar Villareal); one involved ten (Cedric D'Wayne Howard);
one, six (Michael Anthony Lopez, Jr.); six, three (Steven Brian Alvarado, Randy Arroyo, Levi
Jaimes Jackson, Eddie C. Johnson, and Son Vuk-Hai Tran); and one, two (Leo Gordon Little).
198. App. A.
199. App. A (those identified as "Alone, but" include: Justin Wiley Dickens, Anthony Jerome
Dixon, Ronald Chris Foster, Patrick Horn, Larry L. Jenkins, Jr., Anzel Keon Jones, William
Thomas Knotts, Kenneth Jeremy Laird, Geno Capoletti Wilson, and Gregory Wynn).







Capoletti Wilson was driving some friends home from school.20 5 After
stopping to talk with a girl on the street, they spotted a door-to-door
salesman.2 °6 Wilson got out of the car and approached the salesman,
first asking him for change for a fifty dollar bill, and then demanding all
his money.20 7 When the salesman said he had none, Wilson shot him
while his friends watched.20 8
The cases, even those ostensibly involving a lone offender, confirm
that group offending, generally with no more than three friends and no
gang affiliation, is as prevalent among those who received the death pen-
alty as for those convicted of less serious crimes. As disturbing as these
conclusions may be, even more unsettling is the small number of juve-
nile offenders on death row who appear to have been the leaders or
"alpha males" in their offending groups.
C. Peer Influence
Contrary to popular belief, most of those under a sentence of death
were not the principal perpetrators of the crimes for which they received
that penalty. Instead, they were guilty of going along with their friends
or mentors at an age when that is the norm. The criminal behavior of
these juveniles who "went along" demonstrates the immense power of
peer pressure and the solidarity adolescents feel within their group of
"brothers." Although the mechanisms and powers of peer influence are
not well understood, the circumstances of the crimes among the juvenile
death row population studied here confirm Warr's research.2°  The
cases demonstrate that the loyalty, fear of ridicule, and status seeking
identified by Warr and others210 play powerful roles in the criminal
behavior of youth.
Loyalty to a dominating and controlling group leader acting as an
"alpha male" is evident in many of the death row cases. A number of
the youths appear to have been nothing short of pawns of their friends or
relatives. In two instances, the murders were committed to eliminate a
witness against a co-defendant in unrelated criminal proceedings.2 ' In
205. Wilson v. State, 715 S.W.3d 346 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
206. Steve Brewer, Jury Finds Man Guilty in '98 Slaying of Salesman, HOUSTON CHRONICLE,
Dec. 9, 1999, at A39.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. WARR, supra note 26.
210. See supra notes 114-39 and accompanying text.
211. App. A. See Hyde v. State, 778 So. 2d 199, 208 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998), aft d, Exparte
Hyde, 778 So. 2d 237 (Ala. 2000) (convicting James Matthew Hyde for murdering the
investigator who testified in grand jury proceedings against Hyde's friend and co-worker for
defrauding the company by having Hyde clock him in and out of work); Texas Department of
Criminal Justice, Death Row Home Page, Offender Information, Whitney Reeves, at http://www.
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another particularly disturbing case, the juvenile's older cousin ordered
him to kill the supervisor who had fired the cousin.2"2 When the boy
returned without having been able to carry out his cousin's instructions,
the cousin "got on [him] about not killing the clerk. '2 1 3 The following
night the boy returned to the store, and this time, he shot and killed the
clerk.2" 4
In several other cases, older or more experienced co-defendants
called the shots, and their younger colleagues complied, although in
most of the cases it is unclear whether their compliance was borne of
loyalty, status seeking, fear of ridicule, or just plain fear of the alpha
male.21 5 For example, Cedric D'Wayne Howard was sixteen years old
and one of ten youths involved in a gang-related robbery of an elderly
woman thought to have a lot of money.216 A neighbor who overheard
gang members planning the robbery testified that Howard did not say
much and simply seemed willing to assist his friends in breaking into the
woman's home.217 In another case involving two juveniles and two
teenage "adults," the court even noted, regarding Trace Duncan, one of
the juveniles awaiting execution, that his "participation was relatively
minor.
'2 18
Although the motivators in the Howard and Duncan cases were not
clear, the case of Scott Allen Hain exemplifies youthful loyalty inspired
not of admiration or a desire to attain status, but as the product of pure
fear and domination by an older and more experienced co-defendant.
Hain had a history of domination by abusive, alcoholic parents and a
father who coerced him into assisting with burglaries as a child.219
Before trial, doctors submitted a diagnosis that, at the time of the precip-
itating event, Hain had a "fear reaction to finding himself in a fugitive/
tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/reeveswhitney.htm (last updated July 22, 2004) (Whitney Reeves was
convicted for murdering the fourteen-year-old girl who had testified in grand jury proceedings
against Reeves's co-defendant on sexual molestation charges).
212. Bonifay v. State, 626 So. 2d 1310, 1311 (Fla. 1993).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., Duncan v. State, 827 So. 2d 838 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999); State v. Howard, 751
So. 2d 783 (La. 1999), cert denied, 528 U.S. 974 (1999); see Lyn Riddle, Legislature Considers
Ending Execution of Underage Killers, GREENVILLE NEWS, April 2, 2001 at IA (neither of the
juvenile offender's co-defendants, ages eighteen and twenty-three, was convicted of murder; one
of them was not even incarcerated); State v. Soto-Fong, 928 P.2d 610 (Ariz. 1996) (co-defendants
were older than Soto-Fong, had longer criminal records, and were involved in an earlier botched
robbery/shooting); see also App. A (where juvenile Son Vuk-Hai Tran killed the lover of a senior
gang member's girlfriend and then killed others to protect identities of killers).
216. Statc v. Howard, 751 So. 2d 783, 791 (La. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 975 (1999).
217. Id. at 790.
218. Duncan, 827 So. 2d at 850. Even so, he was sentenced to death, along with two of his co-
defendants, for the kidnapping and murder of a female hitchhiker. Id.
219. Hain v. State, 919 P.2d 1130, 1151 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996).
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captive state" by his adult co-defendant, Robert Wayne Lambert, and
therefore lacked the ability to think or act on his own volition. 22' Hain
maintained his loyalty to Lambert to the end and gave police a statement
incriminating Lambert only after Lambert had fingered Hain as the prin-
cipal.22' Despite calls for clemency from all quarters, Hain was executed
by the State of Oklahoma on April 3, 2003.222
In the subset of juvenile offenders serving death sentences for
group sexual assaults we see a classic example of peer-driven teen
behavior gone awry. Seven of those on death row, including two pairs
of co-defendants, were convicted of crimes involving group sexual
assault and murder of the assault victim. 223 In Baker's study of motiva-
tion and demographics in rape-murder cases, she concludes that
"[riapists are young. ' 224 Baker suggests that age is a factor central to
understanding what motivates rapists and states that "youthful predispo-
sition for irresponsible behavior and criminal activity coincides with
male coming of age."' 225 Given the powerful influence of peers and the
importance to young men of uniting with each other,226 Baker concludes
that men often rape women "to demonstrate their prowess, strength, vir-
ulence, and masculinity to other men. [H]aving an audience is criti-
cal."22 7 We have only to notice the sheer brutality of the beating and
sexual assault of a hitchhiker by Trace Duncan and Kenny Loggins and
two of their peers,228 and of the two teenage girls who happened across
the path of Efrian Perez and Raul Omar Villareal and seven of their
fellow gang members at a gang initiation,229 to know that powerful
group dynamics were at work.230
220. Id. at 1148.
221. Id. at 1143.
222. STREIB, supra note 10, at 4.
223. Trace Duncan and Kenny Loggins, Percy Lee, Jose Ignacio Monterrubio, Efrian Perez
and Raul Oman Villareal, and Aaron Wilson.
224. Katherine A. Baker, Once a Rapist: Motivational Evidence and Relevancy in Rape Law,
110 Harv. L. Rev. 563, 600 (1997) (citing National Inst. of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice
& Law Enforcement Assistance Admin., Dep't of Justice, Forcible Rape: Final Project Report 8-9
(1978), which reported that the majority of sex offenders in law enforcement data are between the
ages of eighteen and twenty-five).
225. Baker, supra note 224, at 600.
226. Id. at 606.
227. Id.
228. See Duncan v. State, 827 So. 2d 838 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999).
229. See Cantu v. State, 939 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
230. Baker's "unity" theory of male relationships cannot explain the majority of the sexual
assaults among the juvenile offenders on death row, which involved lone actors, however. For
two of those, an opposite "dividing" theory, in which rape is used to establish power over, or to
denigrate other men, may have been at work. Baker, supra note 224 at 607-08. See Adams v.
State, No. CR-98-0496, 2003 WL 22026043 (Ala. Crim. App. Aug. 29, 2003) (Renaldo Adams
raped and murdered wife after sending husband to ATM to get money); see also Dallas Morning
News, Rick Halperin, Death Penalty News-Texas, Feb. 18, 1999, at http://venus.soci.niu.edu/
2005]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Not all juveniles on death row were followers, however. Several
appear to have been the leaders,23" ' at least to the point of setting in
motion the criminal activity that eventuated in murder. According to
their co-defendants, Roderick Eskridge and Eddie Johnson "mas-
terminded" the robberies, respectively, of two women who had just
received their monthly support checks.232 Similarly, the two brothers
who were the co-defendants of Napoleon Beazley accused him of lead-
ing the charge against a man stepping out of his Mercedes in the drive-
way of his home.233 Christopher Simmons, whose case is now before
the United States Supreme Court,23 4 also appears to have been behind
the robbery at the home of a neighborhood resident the teenagers called
the "voodoo man." '235 Simmons had been bragging to several friends
that he was going to rob and kill the "voodoo man" and that he and those
who helped him would get away with it because they were juveniles. 6
For at least two others, the control exercised by the juveniles now
on death row extended beyond their intended property crimes to the
planned murder of their families. After Mark Anthony Duke's father
refused to loan Duke his truck to go see his girlfriend, Duke convinced
three of his friends to go with him to his father's house and kill him and
three other family members.237 Similarly, Stephen Virgil McGilberry
decided to carjack his sister's car and to kill her and the rest of his
family, after having the family Bronco taken away from him and being
-archives/ABOLISH/rick-halperin/jan99/0559.html (Bruce Lee Williams raped and murdered
wife in husband's presence after carjacking). For others, it is more likely that some other
motivator, such as power, sadism/anger, or a combination, was the driving force, perhaps
particularly for those offenders with mental illness or retardation who were convicted of
committing sex crimes. Baker, supra note 224, at 609-11; see App. A (Kevin Hughes (mentally
retarded and schizophrenic); Nathan Slaton (mentally ill with rare explosive disorder and temporal
lobe epilepsy, extreme emotional disturbance at time of crime); Mauro Barraza (mentally ill,
undefined); Timothy Davis (mentally ill and emotionally disturbed); and Anzel Keon Jones
(mentally ill, undefined)).
231. But note a caveat to this section: In most of these cases, it was the co-defendants, who
testified against those now on death row in exchange for a life sentence or less, who labeled them
as the "leader" or "mastermind." See App. A (Randy Arroyo, Lamorris Chapman, Dale Dwayne
Craig, Ronald Chris Foster, James Matthew Hyde, Levi Jamies Jackson, and Raul Omar
Villareal).
232. Eskridge v. State, 765 So. 2d 508 (Miss. 2000), cert. denied, No. 19990DP-00769-SCT,
2001 U.S. LEXIS 1279 (Feb. 20, 2001).
233. Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2001).
234. Roper v. Simmons, 540 U.S. 1160 (2004); see State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112
S.W.2d 397 (Mo. 2003).
235. State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165 (Mo. 1997). But for the unexpected presence of the
wife of the "voodoo man" and her recognition of Simmons from a recent traffic incident, the
break-in might have ended with the robbery.
236. Id. at 169.
237. Duke v. State, 889 So. 2d I (Ala. Crim. App. 2002).
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driven to school by his mother.238
The primary motivation for Duke, as he told his friends before they
set out to commit the murders, was that he was "tired of his father bos-
sing him around. '239 McGilberry was not so much angry as embar-
rassed at being driven to school by his mother instead of driving the
family Bronco himself, a privilege his parents had revoked after he skip-
ped school and lost his job.24° Not surprisingly, both murders were as
brutal as the motivations were immature.24' While immaturity is, by
definition, normative for adolescents, Duke and McGilberry exhibited
signs of extreme immaturity and inability to control their frustration that
place them outside the norm, for reasons apparently never explored by
the courts that sentenced them. Duke's behavior may have been due in
part to psychological damage he suffered as a childhood victim of his
father's abuse.242 For McGilberry, who confessed upon arrest and later
was diagnosed as having a "sociopathic personality structure" that made
him unable to distinguish right from wrong, the roots appear to lie in
mental illness.243
Neither Duke nor McGilberry had a violent past. In fact, neither
had any record of juvenile or criminal court involvement. 24  Their
crimes were horrendous, but they must be understood, at least in part, as
the acts of youth whose parents' conduct so threatened their status
among their peers that they could not bear it.
Status concerns similarly motivated the conduct of some lone
actors. These individuals' comments and conduct before and after the
crimes indicate that each felt compelled to improve his status in his peer
group. Kenneth Jeremy Laird, who acted alone, bragged to his friends
that he was going to get a blue Toyota 4 x 4.245 He located one, and as
he lay in wait at the home of its owner, Laird called his buddies to tell
them that he was moving to the owner's upscale neighborhood on the
north side of Phoenix, Arizona.24 6 In two other cases of teens acting
alone, Larry L. Jenkins, Jr. and Gregory Wynn shared the proceeds of
their robberies with their friends.247 Jenkins' friends testified that on the
night of the robbery of a local laundromat, they rode around with Jen-
238. McGilberry v. State, 741 So. 2d 894, 903 (Miss. 1999).
239. Duke, 889 So. 2d at 10.
240. McGilberry, 741 So. 2d at 903.
241. See McGilberry, 741 So. 2d at 894; see also Duke, 889 So. 2d at 1.
242. Duke, 889 So. 2d at 37.
243. McGilberry, 741 So. 2d at 903, 917.
244. McGilberry, 741 So. 2d 894; Duke, 2002 WL 1145829.
245. State v. Laird, 920 P.2d 769, 771 (Ariz. 1996).
246. Id.
247. Jenkins v. State, 498 S.E.2d 502 (Ga. 1988); Wynn v. State, 804 So. 2d 1122 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2000), cert. denied, Ex parte Wynn, 804 So. 2d 1152 (Ala. 2001).
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kins in the victim's van and went to a club in a nearby town, where they
all spent the night together at another friend's home.248 After robbing a
Hardee's restaurant, Wynn shared the proceeds with two friends and
bragged about what he had done.249
Peers appear to have influenced nearly eighty percent (fifty-six of
seventy-two) of the juvenile offenders who received the death penalty,
either by their direct participation in the criminal acts themselves (forty-
six) or by their involvement with the defendant immediately before or
after the crime (ten).150 However, only four crime partners are on death
row.25' Few other co-defendants were sentenced to death,252 and a large
2531 onumber entered into plea agreements for life imprisonment, terms of
254 5years, or even probation,  in exchange for their testimony against
their counterparts who are now on death row. 6  A handful of co-
defendants were acquitted.257
C. Relationship to Victims
Turning to an analysis of the relationship of the offenders to their
victims, the cases show that more than one-half (forty-one) of the crimes
were against strangers, including two police officers 8.2 5  Those acting
alone were convicted of murdering strangers in thirteen of the cases,
259
and the remaining twenty-nine cases, including the two police officer
incidents, involved group offenders. 260 These proportions are consistent
with the two-thirds reported generally for multiple offender killing of
strangers, 211 as is the fact that nearly all of the murders of strangers
248. Jenkins, 498 S.E.2d at 507.
249. Wynn, 804 So. 2d at 1127. Testimony that Wynn had killed to earn a teardrop tattoo (a
gang symbol of proof that he had killed someone) was excluded from evidence. Id at 1128.
250. See App. A (The latter group consists of those identified as "Alone, but.").
251. See App. A (Trace Duncan and Kenny Loggins; Efrian Perez and Raul Omar Villareal).
252. See App. A (Arroyo, Duke, Duncan and Loggins, Golphin, Howard, Lee, Perez, and
Villareal).
253. See App. A (Arthur, Craig, Dewberry, Duncan, Loggins, Monterrubio, Ramirez, and
Tran).
254. See App. A (Arroyo, Bonifay, Craig, Hyde, and Jackson).
255. See App. A (Arthur).
256. See e.g., Bonifay v. State, 680 So. 2d 413, 415 (Fla. 1996); State v. Craig, 699 So. 2d 865
(La. 1997); Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 435 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); State v. Hughes, 493 S.E.2d
821 (S.C. 1997); Hyde v. State, 778 So. 2d 199 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998); State v. Jackson, 918 P.2d
1038 (Ariz. 1996).
257. See App. A (H. Hughes [one co-defendant acquitted]; LeCroy [co-defendant brother
acquitted]; Springsteen [three co-defendants acquitted]).
258. See App. A.
259. See App. A. Six of the thirteen are in the "Alone, but" category.
260. See App. A.
261. See Rowley et al., supra note 56, at 8.
[Vol. 59:135
CAPITALIZING ADOLESCENCE
began as burglaries or robberies.262
Less than forty percent (twenty-two) of the cases involved
acquaintances, and some victims were neighbors.263 Unlike strangers,
the acquaintance and neighbor murders are divided relatively equally
between those who were convicted of acting alone and those who were
with others: thirteen acquaintances and three neighbors, for multiple
offenders; and eight acquaintances and five neighbors, for lone actors.264
Only two cases, far fewer even than the numbers reported by
Rowley and his colleagues,2 65 involved victims who were family mem-
bers. Whereas lone offenders are four times more likely than groups to
be convicted of killing family members,266 the two family murders here
were group crimes led by an aggrieved teenager, and their similarities
are striking.267  Both boys were outraged that their parents had denied
them use of the family vehicle, and both enlisted the help of others in
murdering the offending parent and other family members who could be
witnesses against them. 268 These two cases, thus, are anomalous not
only in their group character, but in the high degree of planning and the
actual recruitment of accomplices that preceded the acts. Those who kill
family members with such premeditation generally act alone or with
another family member.2 69
In the eight "pure" sexual assault cases, 27 ° one-half (four) of the
262. See App. A. Of the multiple offender murders of strangers, two incidents, each placing
two juveniles on death row, started as kidnappings and sexual assaults (Trace Duncan and Kenny
Loggins; Efrian Perez and Raul Omar Villareal). See also Steve Brewer, Teen Gets Death in
Slaying of Lawman; Defendant Again Lashes Out in Court, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, May 26, 1999,
at A27 (recounting a scared Michael Anthony Lopez, Jr.'s evasion of a police officer out of fear of
re-incarceration for a probation violation); Bonifay v. State, 626 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1993) (James
Patrick Bonifay's "revenge assault" on the person who had fired his cousin). For lone actors, the
only non-robbery-induced murder of a stranger was a drive-by shooting (Tonatihu Aguilar). See
App. A.
263. See App. A; Adam Liptak et a)., Ruling Is Awaited on Death Penalty for Young Killers,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 4, 2005, at Al (Robert Acuna convicted and sentenced to death for killing two
elderly neighbors and stealing their car); Jones v. State, No. 72,500, slip op. at 2 (Tex. Crim. App.
June 23, 1999) (Anzel Keon Jones, who acted alone in killing the two women next door, was
angry at them for interrupting a party he was having the night before to complain about the loud
music); Slaton v. State, 680 So. 2d 879 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995), affd, 680 So. 2d 909 (Ala. 1996)
(Nathan Slaton acted alone in raping and killing the woman who lived next door).
264. See App. A. Three of the acquaintances and one of the neighbors were victims of
offenders in the "alone, but" category.
265. See Rowley et al., supra notes 56, 64-68 and accompanying text.
266. Id.
267. Duke v. State, 889 So. 2d 1 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002); McGilberry v. State, 741 So. 2d 894
(Miss. 1999).
268. Duke, 889 So. 2d at 1; McGilberry, 741 So. 2d at 903.
269. See Rowley et al., supra notes 56, 64-68 and accompanying text.
270. "Pure" sexual assaults are those that appear not to have escalated from robberies or
revenge assaults. Five sexual assaults occurred incident to robberies and two as part of revenge
killings. See App. A.
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victims and assailants were strangers; three were acquaintances; and
only one was a neighbor.27" ' These numbers closely parallel the overall
relationship distribution.272 What is striking about relationships in sex-
ual assault cases is the stark contrast between juvenile offenders acting
alone and those with multiple offenders. None of the victims of solo
offenders were strangers; instead, they were either acquaintances or
neighbors.2 3 In contrast, four of the five victims of group offenses were
strangers, 274 and only one was an acquaintance. 275 The larger four- and
eight-member groups, not surprisingly, were responsible for all of the
sexual assault murders of strangers committed by multiple offenders.
27 6
Although these numbers are too few to have statistical significance, the
multiple offender-stranger relationship validates the fear factor associ-
ated with rape-murder cases.277
In sum, and with the few exceptions noted above, the available
information indicates that the relationship between the juveniles on
death row and their alleged victims mirrors that of their counterparts
elsewhere in prison and on the streets.
E. Escalation to Capital Murder278
Data on the nature of the crimes for which juvenile offenders
271. See App. A. The percentage of sexual assaults involving strangers among death row
juvenile offenders also parallels nationwide data for sexual assault murders across the entire
offender population. See Phyllis L. Crocker, Crossing the Line: Rape-Murder and the Death
Penalty, 26 OHIo N.U.L. Rev. 689, 699 (2000).
272. See supra notes 258-64 and accompanying text.
273. See App. A.
274. See App. A. The number of victims among the multiple offender cases does not match
the number of defendants because in two cases, two co-defendant juvenile offenders are on death
row. See Duncan v. State, 827 So. 2d 838 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (sentencing to death Trace
Duncan and Kenny Loggins for their participation in the kidnapping, sexual assault, and killing of
a female hitchhiker); Cantu v. State, 939 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (sentencing to death
Efrain Perez and Raul Omar Villareal for their involvement in a gang initiation that led to the
sexual assault and killing of two teenage girls). See App. A.
275. See App. A; see also Monterrubio v. State, No. 72,028 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 11, 1996)
(the victim was a friend of the co-defendant, who was Monterrubio's cousin).
276. See App. A (Duncan [four], Loggins [four], Perez [eight]. Villareal [eight]).
277. See Crocker, supra note 271, at 699. Crocker observes that this fear may be misplaced, as
national data from the 1997 Sexual Assault Murder Study found that more than fifty percent of
rape-murders were between acquaintances, another ten percent were among family members or
intimates, and less than forty percent were among strangers. Id. These percentages contrasted
with those among the population Crocker was studying, the twenty-two men convicted of rape-
murder on Ohio's death row. Among that group, thirty-six percent were acquaintances; nine
percent, family/intimates; and fifty-five percent, strangers. Id.
278. The unintended nature of homicide is not the exclusive domain of adolescents who have
received the death penalty. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (overturning death
sentence where defendant stayed in the car when his co-defendants went into a farmhouse
intending robbery); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (same; defendant stayed in the car while
others went in to rob a pawn shop).
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received the death penalty reflect the social science literature: nearly all
of the homicides occurred during or incident to the commission of
another crime. Most often the crime was property-related: twenty-nine
cases started as burglaries; eight as carjackings; and eight as robber-
ies.27 9 Thirteen were what are best characterized as "revenge assaults."
Six of these appear to have been unintentional killings, five were
planned hits induced by others, and two were planned by the defendants
themselves.28° Another eight began and ended as sexual assaults,28'
three were drug-related,28 2 one was an apparently random drive-by
shooting,283 one was the shooting of a police officer in an attempt to
evade arrest for a probation violation,284 and one began with the defen-
dant shooting birds in his backyard.285
The property crimes break down significantly along individual and
group lines only for robberies and carjackings. Individual actors were
convicted of no robberies and only one carjacking,286 compared to seven
robberies287 and seven carjackings 288 for group actors. Burglaries of
279. See App. A.
280. See App. A (Arthur: at adult lover's insistence, killed her husband; Bonifay: on adult
cousin's orders, killed supervisor who had fired cousin; Chapman: killed friend of cheating
girlfriend; Dewberry: killed man who had made gay advances on adult brother co-defendant;
Dominguez: killed woman who had "dissed" girlfriend; Duke: tired of father bossing him around,
killed father and other family members; Hyde: co-defendant planned hit on witness against
himself; A. Jones: killed neighbor who had interrupted his party with complaints about loud
music; Knotts: killed woman who had taunted and forced his friend from a bridge into a creek
during a rainstorm; Lee: killed woman who kicked him, girlfriend, and child out after they had
lived there several months; McGilberry: killed father and other family members after father took
family Bronco away from him; Reeves: killed girl who had testified against co-defendant; Tran:
killed man and his compatriots for dating Tran's gang boss's girlfriend).
281. See App. A (Duncan and Loggins: kidnapped and brutalized female hitchhiker; K.
Hughes: mentally retarded with schizoid personality, pattern of sexual assaults on young girls; S.
Johnson: asked for drink of water, pattern of similar sexual assaults; Monterrubio: victim was a
friend who spent time and smoked marijuana with him and his co-defendant cousin; Perez and
Villareal: after gang initiation involving fighting and drinking, gang-raped and killed two girls
taking a shortcut to visit another friend; Slaton: mentally ill, neighbor saw him shooting birds in
his backyard and later leaving his elderly neighbor's home, where she was found dead).
282. See App. A (Alvarado, Horn, and N. Williams).
283. See App. A (Aguilar).
284. See App. A (Lopez).
285. See App. A (Slaton).
286. See App. A (B. Williams: carjacked couple, raped and killed woman, man survived).
287. See App. A (Bernal: drive-by robbery and shooting; Eskridge: shot woman to obtain
support check she had just received; E. Johnson: attacked driver as he was getting out of car in
driveway; LeCroy: robbed and killed couple who were camping in the same campground as
LeCroy and his family; Little: robbed and killed accountant on his way from Jehovah's Witnesses
office to bank; Solomon: robbed man in disabled vehicle; and Wilson: robbed and killed door-to-
door-salesman).
288. See App. A (Arroyo: carjacked Mazda RX7 to steal parts; Craig: carjacked Bronco to get
transportation to see his girlfriend; Golphin: cajacked finance office worker's car to make
getaway; Holly: carjacked taxicab to get to Chicago; Jackson: carjacked and shot driver to gain
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businesses and residences reveal no statistically significant distinction
between individual and group actors.289 Whether in business or residen-
tial settings, a number of burglaries turned into murder after the victim
surprised, challenged, or frightened the offenders.
For example, Thomas Mark Adams took a knife from his parents'
kitchen with him to scare Mildred Foster when he broke into her home
to steal money to buy drugs.2 9 ° Ms. Foster awoke and screamed, sur-
prising Adams, who told her to be quiet.29 ' When Adams put the knife
down, Foster grabbed it, screamed again, and as Adams attempted to
cover her mouth to quiet her, Foster bit him and tried to stab him. 92
During the struggle that ensued, Adams stabbed Foster in the chest.
2 93
He immediately fled the house and turned himself into the police, crying
hysterically.294
A similar struggle for control of a weapon resulted in the shooting
or stabbing death of the victim in a number of other cases. Ronald Chris
Foster set out to rob a local grocery store and was not even carrying a
weapon when he entered the store.2 95 When the clerk at the market
started to ring up Foster's purchase, Foster jumped over the counter, the
clerk pulled out a gun, and the two struggled.296 The clerk was killed
when the gun went off during the struggle. 297 Similarly, Steven Brian
Alvarado and his co-defendants struggled to gain control of a knife the
victim pulled on them; 298 Justin Wiley Dickens was pinned against a
wall and trying to fend off his victim when his gun went off;299 Kevin
Salvador Golphin and his co-defendant struggled with the state trooper
who had stopped them in a stolen vehicle;3" Nathan Slaton and his
status with Crips; Salinas: carjacked man and infant daughter, no details available; A. Wilson:
carjacked young woman, sexually assaulted and killed her, co-defendant said, because she had
seen their faces).
289. See App. A. Six individuals (R. Adams, T. Adams, Barraza, Cobb, Neal, and Powers
and seven groups (Bridgewater, Capetillo, Dycus, Guillen, Howard, Ramirez, and Wimberly)
were involved in burglaries of residences. Three individuals (Davis, Gibson, Walters) and eight
groups (Bonds, Hart, H. Hughes, Morgan, Pressley, Soriano, Soto-Fong, and Springsteen) were
involved in burglaries of businesses. For residential burglaries, one individual (Laird) is in the
"alone, but" category; for business burglaries, four (Dickens, Foster, Jenkins, and Wynn) occupy
that category.
290. State v. Adams, 439 S.E.2d 760, 761 (N.C. 1992).




295. Foster v. State, 639 So. 2d 1263, 1272 (Miss. 1994).
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Alvarado v. State, 912 S.W.2d 199, 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
299. State v. Justin Wiley Dickens, No. 72,129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
300. State v. Golphin, 533 S.E.2d 168, 184-85 (N.C. 2000).
[Vol. 59:135
CAPITALIZING ADOLESCENCE
neighbor scuffled; 3 1 and Bruce Lee Williams was struggling with his
victim when his gun went off.
30 2
In at least two cases, surprise at the presence of the victim appeared
to cause the escalation of the crime from an intended burglary to capital
murder. Raymond Levi Cobb, while high on marijuana, was surprised
by the victims during his burglary attempt;30 3 and Gregory Wynn was
surprised by a former co-worker when he entered and hid in a Hardee's
to burglarize it after-hours in reaction to his earlier firing.3° In still
other cases, death ensued from the young offenders' overreactions to the
rebellious or other affirmative acts of their intended robbery victims.
The owner of an RX7 that Randy Arroyo and his co-defendants were
attempting to steal tried to flee;30 5 the intended victim of a robbery
outside an ice house ran from Johnnie Bernal and his friends; 30 6 a store
owner lectured Exzavious Gibson about his profanity and triggered Gib-
son's intense anger; 30 7 a young boy's resistance and his mother's scream
set off Larry L. Jenkins during his burglary of a laundromat;0 8 the vic-
tim of a gang-related driveway carjacking hit Eddie C. Johnson in the
face with a grocery bag;309 and one of the workers in the neighborhood
market targeted for robbery by Martin Raul Soto-Fong and his friends
rebelled against them.' 0
In two non-property-related cases, the juvenile offenders appear to
have disproportionately responded to threats to their status as men
among peers. In one such case, a co-worker made a second unwelcome
gay advance on John Dewberry in the presence of Dewberry's older
brother,31 'and in the other, a young woman in whose family's home
Percy Lee had once lived, refused to let Percy and a friend enter the
residence.31 2
301. Slaton v. State, 680 So. 2d 879, 885 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995).
302. See Associated Press, Juvenile Defendant Faces Potential Death Sentence, DEATH
PENALTY NEWS-TEXAS, Feb. 18, 1999, available at http://venus.soci.niu.eduL/-archives/
ABOLISHfick-halperin/jan99/0559.html.
303. Cobb v. State, 85 S.W.3d 258, 261 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
304. Wynn v. State, 804 So. 2d 1122, 1127 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000).
305. See Lisa Sandberg, Young Killers Await Dates with Death; Fresh Faces Belie Violent
Histories, SAN. ANTONIO EXPREsS-NEWS, Jan. 23, 2000 at 14A.
306. See Roma Khanna, Cases Cast Doubt on Ballistics Work at HPD Lab, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Mar. 23, 2003, at Al, available at http://www.prisonactivist.org/pipermail/prisonact-list/2003-
March/006902.htm].
307. Gibson v. State, 404 S.E.2d 781, 784 (Ga. 1991).
308. Jenkins v. State, 498 S.E.2d 502, 507 (Ga. 1998).
309. Selwyn Crawford, Fort Worth Jury Hears Testimony Supporting Death Penalty, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, July 29, 1997 at 13A.
310. State v. Soto-Fong, 928 P.2d 610 (1996).
311. Bexar Jury to Hear Capital Murder Case, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-NEws, July 29, 1997 at
B2.
312. Commonwealth v. Lee, 662 A.2d 645, 648 (Pa. 1995).
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Escalation from assault to murder in sexual assault cases is more
difficult to pinpoint, perhaps because sexual assault itself has such com-
plicated and misunderstood roots and the motivations of sexual offend-
ers are so varied.3 13 The theoretical challenges of these cases are not the
only challenges, however. A review of the available information on the
sexual assault cases studied here reveals little about the circumstances
surrounding the escalation of the assault to the eventual murder of the
assault victims, particularly for those acting alone.31 4
Phyllis L. Crocker's work reveals that this information void is not
unique to juvenile offenders on death row. Crocker observes that the
underlying rapes in rape-murder prosecutions confound expectations by
not receiving the heightened scrutiny the crimes would appear to
demand, but less probing examination than rapes in which the victims
survive.315 Issues central to survivor rape cases, such as questions of
victim consent, the use or threat of force, the relationship between vic-
tim and offender, and how that relationship might have affected what
occurred, assume little significance in rape-murder cases.31 6 Instead, the
central question shifts from whether the state will prosecute at all, to
whether the prosecution will seek the death penalty.3 17 The upshot,
Crocker contends, is that much less is needed to prove rape or attempted
rape in rape-murder cases than in "pure" rape cases.3" 8 Moreover,
because prosecutors accord little gravity to rape when it ends in murder,
rape becomes just "a convenient means to trigger the death penalty. 319
Crocker's observations are particularly poignant when applied to
the rape-murders for which juvenile offenders are now serving death
sentences.320 We know that male adolescents, purely by virtue of their
age and immaturity, are subject to youthful impulsivity, lack of control
and poor judgment,321 along with the combustive combination of peer
influence and sexual drive noted by Baker.322 Use of an unexamined
incident of rape as "a convenient means to trigger the death penalty" '323
in any case should disturb advocates for both victims and the accused.
313. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 224; see also Crocker, supra note 271.
314. See App. A.
315. Crocker, supra note 271, at 704.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. To Crocker, this differential treatment is a profoundly disturbing demonstration of the
insignificance of women's stories. Victims who live to tell their stories are subjected to searing
challenges to their credibility, leading Crocker to conclude that a woman's "silence, when dead, is
more powerful than her voice when alive." Id.
319. Id. at 705.
320. See App. A.
321. See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
322. See Baker, supra note 224, at 600-01.
323. Crocker, supra note 271, at 705.
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In the case of a sixteen- or seventeen-year-old boy, however, allowing
the state's outrage over a rape-murder to supplant the careful examina-
tion of the circumstances of the crime is an injustice perpetuated by the
capital prosecution of adolescents.
The "revenge assaults" are another troubling subset of the juvenile
population on death row. Only one of the thirteen youths convicted of
such assaults was a solo actor,324 two were influenced by others prior to
the incident,325 and the vast majority (ten) acted in groups.32 6 The one
lone actor case bears the earmarks not so much of calculated revenge as
of the moral outrage characteristic of youth,327 as Miguel Dominguez's
actions escalated from "getting even" with his girlfriend's neighbor,
another young woman, for "dissing" his girlfriend, to killing the neigh-
bor.32 8 Similarly, William Thomas Knotts wanted to punish a woman
who had taunted him and a friend and caused his friend to fall off a
bridge into a creek during a rainstorm.329 Chivalrous or "savior" moti-
vations propelled Ronald Lee Bell, Jr. to assist two young female friends
in luring and then murdering an adult male who had made unwanted
sexual advances toward them.33°
Two-thirds (seven) of the group offenders who were involved in
"revenge assaults," however, either planned or were induced by others'
plans to murder their particular victims. In two cases, the murders were
solicited by adults: Mark Sam Arthur's forty-one-year old lover, Car-
men Fonseca, promised him a car for killing her abusive husband, 33 1 and
James Patrick Bonifay's cousin, Robin Archer, convinced him to kill the
person responsible for getting Archer fired from his job.3 32 The other
planned multiple offender "revenge assaults" ranged from gunning down
the unwanted competitor in a love triangle,3 33 to eliminating witnesses
against a friend in unrelated criminal matters (two cases), 3 34 and killing
324. See App. A (Dominguez).
325. See App. A (A. Jones and Knotts).
326. See App. A (Arthur, Bonifay, Chapman, Dewberry, Duke, Hyde, Lee, McGilberry,
Reeves, and Tran).
327. See supra notes 75, 79-80 and accompanying text.
328. Dominguez v. State, 917 P.2d 1364, 1369 (Nev. 1996).
329. Knotts v. State, 686 So. 2d 431, 442 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995).
330. Bell v. State, 841 So. 2d 329, 331-32. (Fla. 2002).
331. Steve Brewer, Teen Gets Probation in Exchange for Testimony in Murder Case, HOUSTON
CHRON., May 28, 1998, at A19.
332. See Bonifay v. State, 626 So. 2d 1310, 1311 (Fla. 1993).
333. See S.K. Bardwell, Suspects Tied to Four Killings, Police Say, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 29,
1997, at 18, available at http://www.chron.com/content/chronicle/aol-metropolitan/97/l 0/29/
triple.2-0.html (Son Vuk-Hai Tran).
334. See Ex parte Hyde, 778 So. 2d 237, 238 (Ala. 2000) (stating that after James Matthew
Hyde's co-defendant/friend was caught and prosecuted for having Hyde clock him into and out of
work, the two planned to kill the police investigator who testified at grand jury proceedings
against Hyde's friend); see also Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Death Row Home Page,
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parents (and other family members) for refusing use of the family vehi-
cle (two cases, as described above).3 35
Setting aside the murders "for hire" and other targeted hits, the
juvenile death row population appears to display the spontaneity and
impulsivity that is the norm in adolescence. As with Beyer's study of
seventeen juvenile offenders,33 evidence of the unanticipated nature of
the murders is revealed in offenders' comments to the police at the time
of their arrest or much later, from prison. Some said that the gun "just
went off' during a struggle337 or the confusion of the moment,338 and
one said he still was not sure why he pulled the trigger.33 9
Moreover, like Napoleon Beazley, more than one-half of the juve-
nile offenders presently on death row had no record of juvenile or crimi-
nal court involvement before the crimes for which they were sentenced
to die.34° For others, like T.J. Jones and Toronto Patterson, their
Offender Information, Whitney Reeves, at http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/reeveswhitney.htm (last
updated July 22, 2004) (discussing that the girl whom Whitney Reeves and his co-defendant killed
had testified against the co-defendant in his trial for sexual molestation of minors).
335. See supra notes 237-44 and accompanying text (Mark Anthony Duke and Stephen Virgil
McGilberry).
336. Beyer, supra note 62. All of the juveniles in Beyer's study who had used a gun said they
never intended to shoot it; it "just went off." Id. at 27.
337. See App. A (Bruce Lee Williams: During abduction of an Asian couple in car, Williams
said the "gun went off' during a struggle with the victim after she offered to perform a sex act;
John Curtis Dewberry: When the victim made a homosexual advance at Dewberry, his head butted
the gun, and "it just went off").
338. See App. A (Taurus Carroll: robbery of dry-cleaning and laundry business with one
accomplice. Carroll was nervous, and the co-defendant was demanding more money; one victim
was shouting, and the "gun just went off"); see also Carroll v. State, 852 So. 2d 801, 807 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1999).
339. See App. A (Leo Gordon Little: abduction of church accountant to withdraw money from
ATM machine. Little and his friend took the victim to the country, made him kneel along the
roadside, and shot him in the head. From prison, Little said he still is not sure why he pulled the
trigger.); see also Matt Flores, Youth Sentenced to Die for Killing Jehovah's Witness, SAN
ANTONio-ExPREss NEWS, Mar. 6, 1999, at lB.
340. See App. A. In addition to Beazley, Foster, Herman Hughes, Jr. and Soriano had no
record, juvenile or criminal, before the murders for which they were convicted and sentenced to
death. No prior juvenile or criminal conduct is mentioned in the available records for thirty other
juvenile offenders on death row (Adams, Alvarado. Arthur, Barraza, Bernal, Dickens, Duke,
Dycus, Eskridge, Gibson, Guillen, Hart, Holly, Jenkins, E. Johnson, Jones, Little, Lopez,
McGilberry, Monterrubio, Morgan, Perez, Powers, Reeves, Solomon, Springsteen, Tran, Villareal,
N. Williams, and Wilson). In three instances (Golphin, K. Hughes, S. Johnson), there were
allegations, but no convictions, of other crimes committed near or after the crimes for which they
were sentenced to death. Nine other cases, five from Alabama (Duncan, Hyde, Loggins, Pressley,
and Wynn), and one each from Florida (LeCroy) and Pennsylvania (Lee), describe the defendant
as having "no significant history of prior criminal acts." Whether this means "no history at all,"
"only minor juvenile history," or another of several possible interpretations is unclear, but in at
least some of the cases, defense counsel argued against the use of the term because of the
implication that their clients had offended, though in a merely minor or "insignificant" manner.
Thus, it may be that further investigation into those cases would reveal no prior record at all, and
thus further increase the total of those with no prior criminal conduct.
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offenses reflect the failure of the juvenile justice system to effectively
address problems of escalating criminal activity among troubled
youth.3 4 1 Even with the systemic failures, however, only one of the sev-
enty-two had any prior record of violence toward others. 4 2 Yet all sev-
enty-two received the punishment that is to be reserved for "the worst of
the worst.
343
No part of the discussion here is intended to excuse the conduct of
those who kill others, whatever the reason or lack of reason. For some
of the juvenile offenders on death row, analysis of the group and peer
issues surrounding the incidents described here suggests that they were
the principal players in the murders for which they were sentenced to
die. For the great majority, however, one can reach no such conclusion;
and in nearly every case, the role of peers in creating a fertile environ-
ment for aggressive criminal conduct is indisputable. Nonetheless,
neither the law nor our criminal justice system recognizes this simple
fact of youth. In fact, in some critical instances described below, norma-
tive adolescent conduct becomes yet another strike against teenage
offenders.
IV. CONSIDERING ADOLESCENCE IN CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
A. Introduction
Developments in death penalty law and juvenile justice in recent
years reveal an uncomfortable anomaly. While the late 1990s and early
2000s have seen unprecedented and growing recognition of the inhu-
manity of the death penalty, 3" juvenile criminality has continued to be
the target of increasingly severe, anti-therapeutic, and unforgiving sanc-
tions.345 Beginning in the mid-1980s, legislatures nationwide enacted a
number of "get tough" juvenile crime measures, the most significant of
which removed certain classes of crimes, generally those resulting in
death or other serious bodily injury, from the jurisdiction of the juvenile
341. See App. A. Eleven are identified as having had some involvement with the juvenile
justice system during their youth (Craig, Davis, Dewberry, Dominguez, Howard, Jackson, Knotts,
Slaton, Soto-Fong, B. Williams, and G. Wilson). One of those (Knotts), however, was merely a
status offender, a runaway from an abusive home environment who had been locked up in a
juvenile facility. Knotts v. State, 686 So. 2d 431, 444-45 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995).
342. See App. A. (Bridgewater).
343. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 190, at 57.
344. See STREIB, supra note 158, at 5-6. But see Scripps Howard News Service, Rise in Death
Sentence for Juveniles Ignites Debate, DETROIT NEws, July 15, 2002 (reporting that juvenile death
penalty rates have risen "in modem times").
345. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the
Conservative "Backlash," 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447 (2003); Phillip J. Cook & John H. Lamb, The
Unprecedented Epidemic in Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & JUSTICE 27 (1998); ZIMRING, supra note
15, at 37.
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court.3 4 6
With the legislative and executive branches stripping the juvenile
courts of their jurisdiction to try juveniles charged with certain crimes,
even when the charges are lodged against the very young,34 7 the criminal
courts must accept the responsibility to do what juvenile courts have
always done. They must recognize the difference between adolescents
and adults. To do that, the legal and procedural rules that govern crimi-
nal court proceedings against adolescents alleged to have committed
violent crimes must reflect what we know about youth. The discussion
below is meant to commence the process of reconciliation between the
criminal law and the social sciences. It begins by setting out two impor-
tant principles that must guide our thinking about youth crime. It then
suggests certain areas that call out for reform.
A. Guiding Principles
1. A KID IS STILL A KID, EVEN WHEN HE KILLS
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that
juveniles are different from adults in the eyes of the law, even in death
penalty jurisprudence. In Thompson v. Oklahoma,34 8 the Court ruled
that a certain class of defendants convicted of committing a capital mur-
der is not eligible for execution: those who, at the time of the crime,
were fifteen years of age or younger. 34 9 Nevertheless, neither the crimi-
nal courts nor those responsible for promulgating criminal laws and pro-
cedures have acted upon that principle in the years since Thompson.
Adolescents tried in criminal court are stripped of their youth and treated
for all purposes as adults, even though the Supreme Court has provided
an avenue for recognition of their differences. More important than the
precise age at which the demarcation between "juvenile" and "adult"
occurs is the fact that the Court has established any such demarcation.
346. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense:
Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 472-73
(1987) [hereinafter Legislative Changes]; Kristen Simms Cross, When Juvenile Delinquents are
Treated as Adults: The Constitutionality of Alabama's Automatic Transfer Statute, 50 ALA. L.
REv. 155, 157 (Fall 1998); Marcy R. Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, The Back Door to Prison:
Waiver Reform, "Blended Sentencing," and the Law of Unintended Consequences, 91 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 997, 998-99 (2001).
347. E.g., Dana Canedy, 2 Opposing Theories in a Murder, and Both Are the Prosecution 's,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2002, at Al (reporting on the commencement of the trial of brothers Alex
and Derek King for the murder of their father in late 2001, when they were twelve and thirteen;
prosecution also tried a forty-year-old handyman, against whom the boys testified, for their
father's murder).
348. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
349. Id. at 835. Fourteen years later, in Atkins v. Virginia, the Court announced that those with
mental retardation, like those aged fifteen and under, are ineligible for the death penalty. Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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Having ruled that those fifteen and younger are not old enough to be
executed, the Court has established immaturity as a factor of legal sig-
nificance, 35° and that principle must inform all criminal justice policy
affecting the treatment of youth.
Prosecutors, judges, and legislators must recognize the phrase "trial
as an adult" as the misnomer that it is. Newspaper coverage of the Sep-
tember 2002 trial of brothers Alex and Derek King, ages twelve and
thirteen at the time of their father's murder, is illustrative. Accounts up
to and throughout the trial and sentencing of the Florida boys repeatedly
stated that they were being "tried as adults."3 '' But being tried in adult
court does not mean that those young boys suddenly became adults; it
simply means that the jurisdiction over the proceedings was changed
from juvenile to adult court. Our courts and legislators must begin to
understand and appreciate this simple fact. We must cease engaging in
the metamorphic fiction of trying juveniles "as adults," and acknowl-
edge that when a juvenile is tried in adult criminal court, he is still a
child, or at best, a youth, notwithstanding the label attached to his
removal from the juvenile justice system to the criminal justice system.
Instead of glossing over the differences between adults and children, we
must embrace them and reflect them in our laws and procedures. Doing
so will require not a dramatic shift in criminal law jurisprudence, but a
return to its foundations.
2. PENAL PROPORTIONALITY
Penal proportionality is a core principle of American criminal law.
Historian Francis Allen has written that, for more than two centuries, "a
persistent strand in liberal thought relating to penal justice has been the
notion that the severity of criminal penalties should be limited by and
proportioned to the culpability of the offender and his offense. ' 352 Pun-
ishment can be fair only if it is measured by both the amount of harm
done and the blameworthiness of the harm-doer.353 Thus, our courts
350. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835; Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982)
(recognizing the significance of youth as a mitigating factor in capital cases); see also State ex rel.
Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 399-400 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (applying the rationales of
Thompson and Eddings to overturn the death sentence imposed on seventeen-year-old Christopher
Simmons).
351. See Bill Kaczor, Separate Verdict Shocks Jurors, LAS VEGAS REv. J., Sept. 8, 2002, at
IOA; Canedy, supra note 347, at A14.
352. FRANCIS ALLEN, HABITS 42-43 (1996). Even though, or perhaps because, he is a Briton,
Allen for decades has written with great insightfulness about the American legal system. See, e.g.,
Francis Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L.
REv. 1 (1950); Francis Allen, The Exclusionary Rule in the American Law of Search and Seizure,
52 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 246 (1961).
353. Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 Tax. L. REv. 799, 800
(2003).
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ought to be in the practice of attempting to fashion sanctions that will
meet the individual needs of the offender, taking as a starting point the
magnitude of the harm done and the degree of the individual offender's
participation. That assessment must begin, for adolescent offenders,
with the work of those who know adolescents best. Chief among those
are developmental psychologists Elizabeth Scott and Thomas Grisso and
their colleagues in the social sciences who have devoted their careers to
advancing our understanding of the nature of youth.3 54
Scott and Grisso describe certain salient features of adolescence as
the developmental basis for the distinction between juvenile and adult
culpability:
The criminal law posits that the offender is a rational actor, autono-
mously choosing "to do the bad thing" on the basis of personal values
and preferences. The legitimacy of punishment is undermined if
criminal choices depart substantially from this autonomy model. If
youthful choices to offend are based on diminished ability to make
decisions, or if the choices (or the values that shape the choices) are
strongly driven by transient developmental influences, then the pre-
sumption of free will and rational choice is weakened.355
We know from the social science literature and the cases reviewed
above and elsewhere and, no doubt from personal experience, that what
Scott and Grisso say is true. Youthful choices are hampered by imma-
ture and untested decision-making and are often driven by the uniquely
adolescent magnetism of peer influence in its many manifestations.
Yet, fundamental principles of proportionality based on that knowl-
edge are missing entirely from legal rules governing the trial and sen-
tencing of juvenile offenders charged with violent criminal acts. It is
indeed perverse that in a time when prosecutors enjoy broad discretion
in the treatment of juveniles at the charging stage and judges have some-
what less, but still great, discretion at the sentencing stage, neither the
354. See generally YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE.
(Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000); Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg,
(lm)Maturiy of Judgment in Adolescence: Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable Than Adults,
18 BEHAV. SCl. & L. 741, 742 (2000); Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence,
29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547 (2000); Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of
Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 137, 172-73 (1997); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by
Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile
Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1012 (2003).
355. Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental
Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 172-73 (1997); see
also Justice Brennan's dissent in Stanford, where he opines that even eighteen years of age is a
conservative measure for full adult culpability because many psychological and emotional
changes consistent with adulthood do not occur until the early twenties. Stanford v. Kentucky,
492 U.S. 361, 395-96 (1989).
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substantive juvenile law nor the substantive criminal law reflects propor-




When we consider the contribution of the social sciences to assess-
ment of the liability and culpability of criminal defendants, our thoughts
generally turn to mitigation evidence at the sentencing stage of proceed-
ings. Without discounting the importance of sound and thorough miti-
gation investigation and presentation for sentencing purposes, I want to
suggest that for adolescents facing capital charges, focusing on mitiga-
tion at the sentencing stage is too little too late. Youth is rarely, if ever,
sufficient in and of itself to overcome aggravators common to the statu-
tory sentencing schemes of most death penalty states, and I suspect that
consideration of additional characteristics of youth, such as the group
offending and peer influence elements treated here, would have little
practical effect at sentencing. Instead, juveniles exposed to the possibil-
ity of a capital conviction and death sentence must have an opportunity,
before trial, to present evidence challenging their eligibility for trial on
capital charges. Matters of such significance cannot, under Supreme
Court precedent, be subject solely to the discretion of the government in
its role as prosecutor.
Moreover, certain legal rules must be changed. A fundamental
tenet of criminal law is that "a man intends the natural and probable
consequences of his actions." '356 But can the same be said of a boy who
is not yet, even by the basest of societal standards, a man? Doctrines of
criminal liability, such as the felony murder rule and its attendant vicari-
ous responsibility, which were developed in the context of assessing the
culpability of mature and competent adults, do not accord with the psy-
chological and social characteristics of adolescent defendants.357 Nor
does the refusal of more than one-half of state and federal jurisdictions
to adopt principles of diminished responsibility358 accord with our
knowledge of youth.
At the sentencing stage, reform efforts must be directed at certain
aggravators, discussed below, that fail to take into account the differ-
ences we know to exist between juveniles and adults, differences that
should inform not just the sentencing decision but criminal liability and
356. See ZIMRING, supra note 15, at 141.
357. Id. at 138-42 (discussing diminished responsibility).
358. Travis H.D. Lewin, Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Cases for Purposes Other Than the
Defense of Insanity, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1051, 1055 (1975).
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adolescent culpability in the first instance. Therapeutic considerations
must drive youth crime policies in general, and they suggest yet another
reform, one which would explicitly address and allow considerations of
mercy.
2. PRETRIAL CAPITAL ELIGIBILITY HEARINGS
In Kent v. United States,3 59 the Supreme Court held that a boy of
sixteen was entitled to a hearing in juvenile court before the government
could institute proceedings against him in adult court.360 Justice Fortas,
writing for the Court, stated, "there is no place in our system of law for
reaching a result of such tremendous consequences without ceremony -
without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a state-
ment of reasons. 3 61 The Court did not base its decision in Kent on due
process, as did Gault and its progeny, or on any other constitutional
grounds, but rather on its interpretation of the District of Columbia stat-
ute at issue "read in the context of constitutional principles relating to
due process. ' 362 Thus, the Supreme Court has not recognized a constitu-
tional right to a hearing before being tried in the adult criminal system.
But the absence of an absolute right is not a license to ignore the teach-
ing of Kent, and that teaching is clear: Our legal system requires a hear-
ing comporting with Gault-like due process in matters of such
consequence as transferring a child from the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court to adult criminal court. If that is true in cases involving non-capi-
tal charges, as in Kent,363 certainly the protection must apply to deci-
sions concerning the trial of juveniles charged with capital offenses.
Despite Kent, few juveniles receive such individualized considera-
tion before they are tried in adult court. Among the seventy-two juve-
nile offenders on death row, available records reflect that hearings were
conducted in only seven cases, 364 and in one Mississippi case, the court
359. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). Kent was the first of the Warren Court
decisions that caused the "constitutional domestication of the juvenile court." See In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 22 (1967) (establishing right to counsel and other elements of due process for juveniles
and stating that "the features of the juvenile system which its proponents have asserted are of
unique benefit will not be impaired by constitutional domestication"); see also In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile
delinquency proceedings); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1970) (holding that
fundamental fairness does not require jury trials for juveniles); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519
(1975) (holding that the double jeopardy bar contained in the Fifth Amendment applies to
delinquency adjudications).
360. Kent, 383 U.S. at 557.
361. Id. at 554.
362. Id. at 557.
363. Kent was indicted on eight counts of housebreaking, robbery, and rape. Id. at 548.
364. Four had hearings in juvenile court on the prosecutor's petition for certification to adult
criminal court. See Ex parte Hart, 612 So. 2d 536, 539 (Ala. 1992); Knotts v. State, 686 So. 2d
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specifically rejected the juvenile's request for a transfer hearing, con-
cluding that state law did not require it.365 This circumvention of Kent
has come about through the passage of state statutes that divest juvenile
courts of jurisdiction over certain crimes, accomplishing by legislative
fiat what Kent said could no longer be accomplished even by judges
alone.
Nevada's statute exemplifies one version of these "legislative
waiver '  provisions. Section 62B.330(3) of the Nevada Revised Stat-
utes excludes from juvenile court jurisdiction anyone charged with mur-
der or attempted murder, certain sexual assaults, certain firearms
offenses, and all other related offenses "arising out of the same facts. 3 67
Those charges simply do not fall within the statutory definition of a
"delinquent act" for purposes of juvenile court jurisdiction, and for mur-
der and attempted murder the exclusion applies no matter how young the
alleged perpetrator is.3 68 Assuming the constitutional legitimacy of such
statutes,369 it is nonetheless true that the important policy concerns
expressed in Kent and throughout the juvenile justice system call for
pretrial consideration, on a case-by-case basis, of the eligibility of
juveniles for prosecution on capital charges.
An analogue for such hearings is the now constitutionally mandated
pretrial determination of mental retardation under Atkins v. Virginia.37°
Pretrial capital eligibility hearings, like pretrial determinations of mental
431, 441 .(Ala. Crim. App. 1995); Slaton v. State, 680 So. 2d 879, 904 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995),
affid, Ex parte Slaton, 680 So. 2d 909 (Ala. 1996); State v. Soto-Fong, 928 P.2d 610 (Ariz. 1996).
Three were "reverse certification" motions by defendants in criminal court. See Davis v. State,
554 So. 2d 1094 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986); Duke v. State, 889 So. 2d I (Ala. Crim. App. 2002);
Hyde v. State, 778 So. 2d 199, 224 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998), affid, Exparte Hyde, 778 So. 2d 237
(Ala. 2000). Six were in Alabama (Davis, Duke, Hart, Hyde, Knotts, and Slaton), and one was in
Arizona (Soto-Fong).
365. Foster v. State, 639 So. 2d 1263, 1307-08 (Miss. 1994).
366. Two types of statutory provisions are common: "legislative waiver" statutes, in which the
legislature categorically removes jurisdiction from the juvenile court for certain offenses; and
' judicial waiver" statutes, in which the juvenile court determines, pursuant to legislatively
established criteria, whether to retain jurisdiction or "waive" the juvenile into adult court. See,
e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. 62B.330(3) (2005) (legislative waiver); NEv. REV. STAT. 62B.390 (2005)
(judicial waiver).
367. See NEv. REV. STAT. 62B.330(3) (2005) (murder or attempted murder); (2)(b) (sexual
assault); (2)(c) (firearms offenses); (2)(d) (felonies resulting in death or substantial bodily harm).
Each subsection includes the language "and any other related offenses arising out of the same
facts... regardless of the nature of the offense."
368. NEV. REV. STAT. 62B.330(3)(a) (2005).
369. That issue is beyond the scope of this paper. Scholars and advocates have discussed and
debated the constitutionality of legislative waiver provisions in numerous articles over the past
decade. See, e.g., Legislative Changes, supra note 346, at 1306; Cross, supra note 346; Douglas
A. Hager, Does the Texas Juvenile Waiver Statute Comport with the Requirements of Due
Process?, 26 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 813 (1995).
370. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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retardation, would focus on matters of mitigation traditionally reserved
for post-trial sentencing determinations. Principles of penal proportion-
ality and "a kid is still a kid" would guide these pretrial capital eligibility
proceedings. As in cases of mental retardation, each jurisdiction would
establish the necessary procedures for such hearings.37'
3. LIABILITY DOCTRINES
a. Felony Murder and Vicarious Responsibility
The common law felony murder rule holds that if in the commis-
sion of a felony one commits an unintended murder, the offender is
guilty of murder.3 72 The essence of the felony murder rule, thus, is the
exaction of punishment for the random nature of a crime resulting in the
death of the victim. As Anne Campbell has observed, "[t]he dividing
line between an aggravated assault and a homicide is often a matter of
luck. In most cases of homicide with a gun, the killer does not intend to
kill. Usually a single shot is fired, and chance decides whether it strikes
the victim's chest or leg."'37 3 Because unintended consequences are the
hallmark of adolescent behavior, the felony murder rule is particularly
harsh in its application to youth.
Even though most jurisdictions have placed limits on the scope of
the felony murder rule, 37 4 they have not taken the further step of limiting
the responsibility of co-offenders who were not the triggerman. Long-
standing principles of vicarious responsibility impose liability on all
those participating in the underlying felony on a co-equal basis.375
Thus, a killing in the course of the commission of certain felonies, such
as armed robbery, burglary, rape, and kidnapping, justifies a murder
conviction for all accomplices, regardless of each individual's degree of,
or actual, participation in the act of killing. 376 Wayne LaFave illustrates
this legal doctrine as follows:
Even though [A and B] have made no... agreement, if in the process
of robbing or attempting to rob X B's gun goes off accidentally, kill-
ing X, A would be guilty of the felony murder of X as much as B
371. See Death Penalty Information Center, States that Have Changed Their Statutes to
Comply with the Supreme Court's Decision in Atkins v. Virginia, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.
org/article.php?scid=28&did=668 (last visited Jan. 22, 2005).
372. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 744 (4th ed. 2003).
373. ANNE C. CAMPBELL, MEN, WOMEN AND AGGRESSION 127 (1993).
374. LAFAVE, supra note 372, at 744 (listing four types of limits states have used: permitting
the rule's use as to only certain types of felonies, more strictly interpreting the requirement of
proximate or legal cause, constricting the time frame defining the felony, and requiring that the
felony be independent of the homicide).
375. Id. at 747-49.
376. David McCord, State Death Sentencing for Felony Murder Accomplices Under the
Enmund and Tison Standards, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 843, 843 (2000).
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would be, under the rule concerning parties to crime that all parties
are guilty for deviations from the common plan which are the fore-
seeable consequences of carrying out the plan (an accidental shooting
during an armed robbery being a typical example of a foreseeable
deviation from the plan to rob).377
Because an accomplice who was not even on the scene of the kill-
ing faces a penalty equal to that of the actual killer, questions of individ-
ual culpability may go unexamined in every multiple offender felony-
murder case. While this departure from the principle of penal propor-
tionality is problematic in any instance, it confounds both justice and
reason in capital cases. Yet, felony murders are the single most common
type of murder for those serving death sentences, both generally 378 and
among the adolescent population studied here.379 This is true despite the
fact that felony murders represent a relatively small proportion of non-
capital homicides.38
Richard Rosen38" ' and others38 2 have criticized the felony-murder
rule as an unprincipled departure from criminal law requirements that
liability be predicated on an individual's mens rea and level of participa-
tion in the offense.383 Although the Supreme Court attempted, in a
series of cases in the 1980s, 384 to establish a workable standard for
determining culpability in felony-murder capital cases, that standard has
not produced reliability in the state courts, where the vast majority of
death sentences are rendered.3 85 After analyzing nearly two hundred
state supreme court decisions in felony murder capital cases, David
377. LAFAVE, supra note 372, at 744.
378. Crocker, supra note 271, at 695 (citing SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH
AND DISCRIMINATION 45 (1989) (reporting felony murder as basis for 80% of those on death row
in Florida and Georgia)); David C. Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the
Administration of the Death Penalty: A Challenge to State Supreme Courts, 15 STETSON L. REV.
133, 138 (1986) (more than 80% of death row defendants became death eligible because of state
felony-murder rules).
379. See supra notes 278-339 and accompanying text.
380. See Crocker, supra note 271, at 695 (citing GRoss & MAURO, supra note 378, at 45
(reporting data from Georgia, where 17.5% of all homicides were felony murders, compared to
80% of those on death row; and Florida, where the proportions were similar, 18.1% to 80%)).
381. Richard A. Rosen, Felony Murder and the Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence of Death, 31
B.C. L. REV. 1103 (1990).
382. See, e.g., McCord, supra note 376, at 843-44; Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober
Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital
Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 359 (1995); Norman J. Finkel, Capital Felony-Murder,
Objective Indicia, and Community Sentiment, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 819, 819-820 (1990); George P.
Fletcher, Reflections on Felony-Murder, 12 Sw. U. L. REV. 413, 427-29 (1981).
383. Rosen, supra note 381, at 1104-05.
384. Enmund v. Florida, 485 U.S. 782 (1982); Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986); Tison
v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987). For a discussion and analysis of those rulings, see McCord,
supra note 376, at 844-60.
385. McCord, supra note 376, at 892-93.
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McCord concluded that mistakes are inevitable unless the courts adopt
certain reforms.386
McCord proposes reforms at both the trial and appellate levels.
Citing as an example the Montana Supreme Court's conclusion under its
state constitution,387 McCord calls for a requirement that each death-
eligible defendant have the prior intent, or knowledge of an accom-
plice's intent, to kill.388 McCord also would exclude from death eligibil-
ity those killings arising out of "simple burglary gone quickly awry,"389
and would impose additional safeguards, such as "clear corroboration"
of the testimony of a turncoat cohort or jailhouse informant 390 and proof
of the defendant's presence at the murder scene.39 ' At the appellate
level, McCord advocates that courts apply a "reasoned-but-not-knee-
jerk-intra-case proportionality review. '392 These and other proposed
reforms, McCord notes, would not "completely eliminate wrongful
death sentences for felony murder accomplices," but they would make
those sentences "more just and predictable. 3 93
What is true for felony murder capital cases in general is true for
juvenile offenders on death row, as revealed by the cases studied here.
Of the seventy-two adolescent defendants on death row today, at least
forty-three, or nearly sixty percent, were convicted of murders commit-
ted during the course of another felony. 394 Few of those juvenile offend-
ers were the principal actors, yet all forty-three received the death
penalty. State courts and legislatures must make reform of the felony-
murder rule and its vicarious responsibility component a priority, if we
are to spare our youth from wrongful executions.
386. Id.
387. See id. at 893 (citing Kills on Top v. State, 928 P.2d 182, 204 (Mont. 1996)).
388. Id.
389. Id. at 894.
390. Id. at 893.
391. Id. at 894.
392. Id. at 894-95.
393. Id. at 896.
394. See supra notes 278-339 and accompanying text.
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b. Diminished Responsibility, a.k.a. "Youth Discount 395
Sanford Kadish has described as "niggardly" 396 the law's response
to the defense of excuse.3 97 The law's resistance to the excuse of dimin-
ished responsibility is no exception. Less than one-half of state and fed-
eral jurisdictions recognize diminished responsibility as an excusing
defense,398  LaFave concludes that the majority of jurisdictions have
based their rejection of diminished responsibility on "a mistaken
assumption that the doctrine does not involve considerations separate
and distinct from established law concerning the defense of insanity.
In the context of criminal law, insanity is an all-or-nothing proposition;
it is either a complete defense or no defense at all.4" Resistance to
diminished responsibility as an excuse that will diminish, but not negate,
responsibility for a criminal act, generally rests on the erroneous conclu-
sion that a defendant who knows right from wrong4 ' must be fully
responsible for the crime brought about by his actions.40 2
Like insanity, the excuse of infancy has deep roots as a legal
defense to full criminal responsibility.40 3 For some time, state criminal
395. The term "youth discount" was coined by noted juvenile justice scholar Barry C. Feld and
found its first, though hardly its only, published expression in 1988. See Barry C. Feld, The Court
Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L.
Rev. 821, 912 (1988); see also Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court I: Race
and the "Crack Down" on Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REV. 327, 330 (1999); Barry C. Feld,
Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems' Responses to Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & JUST. 189, 250
(1998); Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and
Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOCY 68, 70 (1997); Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth
and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 1127
(1995); Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 724
(1991).
396. Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CAL. L. REv. 257, 262 (1987) ("Infancy and legal
insanity are the only two excuses of [nonresponsibility] the law allows, and since the juvenile
court laws have made the defense of infancy in practice redundant, legal insanity is the only
significant defense remaining in this category.").
397. See id. Kadish begins by stating the basis for criminal law's recognition of excusing
defenses:
In both criminal law and everyday moral judgments the concept of excuse plays a
major role. This is because the practice of blaming is intrinsically selective. It
cannot survive if all harm-doers are to be blamed, any more than it can if none are.
Excuse is one of those central concepts that serve to draw the line between the
blameworthy and the blameless and so make a blaming system possible.
Id. at 257; see also Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091 (1985).
398. LAFAVE, supra note 372, at 452.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. See M'Naughton's Case, 8 ENG. REP. 718 (1843) (establishing knowing right from wrong
as an element of the legal test for insanity).
402. LAFAVE, supra note 372, at 452.
403. Indeed, infancy's roots reach deeper than insanity, appearing first in Roman Civil Law
and evolving fully by the seventeenth century. See LAFAvE, supra note 372, at 485 (citing I E.
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codes perpetuated the infancy doctrine, which presumed that children
under the age of seven lacked the capacity to form criminal intent,
treated children fourteen and older as fully responsible adults, and cre-
ated a rebuttable presumption that children between the ages of seven
and fourteen lacked criminal capacity.404 Kadish wrote in 1987, how-
ever, that "the juvenile court laws have made the defense of infancy in
practice redundant."4 °5 True as Kadish's remark may have been at a
time when juvenile courts' jurisdiction over juveniles reigned supreme,
more recent trends toward trying juveniles in adult court suggest the
wisdom of resurrecting infancy, or a more developmentally appropriate
version of it, as a defense for juveniles being tried "as adults."
Barry Feld's explicit, age-based "youth discount"4 06 may be just
that defense. Feld describes his proposed youth discount as "a sliding
scale of developmental and criminal responsibility" that recognizes "the
lesser culpability of younger offenders."4 7 Although current social sci-
ence learning does not permit precise measurement of the extent to
which adolescents may be entitled to rely on a doctrine of diminished
responsibility such as Feld's youth discount, it suggests an important
conclusion about age and diminished responsibility, to wit: adolescents
achieve different kinds of adult-level competencies at different ages.40 8
For example, if only the cognitive capacity to make judgments in paper-
and-pencil exercises is considered to have importance, adolescents are
usually well equipped by their sixteenth birthdays. 4' If, however, social
experience in areas such as anger and impulse management and coping
with peer pressures is necessary, expecting abilities comparable to adults
before age eighteen or nineteen is mere "wishful thinking."
4 t0
Some may balk at applying an excuse of diminished responsibility
to any of the unlawful acts of youth; others may accept the doctrine in
COKE, INSTITUTES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 247b (1642)); Frederick Woodbridge, Physical and
Mental Infancy in the Criminal Law, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 426, 435 (1939); A. W. G. Kean, The
History of the Criminal Liability of Children, 53 L.Q. REv. 364 (1937).
404. See, e.g., Tanenhaus, supra note 162.
405. Kadish, supra note 396, at 262.
406. See Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and
Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 70 (1997). Feld voices his preference for a
"categorical 'youth discount' that uses age as a conclusive proxy for reduced culpability and a
shorter sentence" to an "'individualized' inquiry into the criminal responsibility of each young
offender" to maintain consistency with the objective standards of criminal law. Id. at 121.
407. Id. at 70. Feld conceives of the "youth discount" as a factor at the sentencing stage, see
id., and has not spoken of it as a doctrine of diminished responsibility. With apologies to
Professor Feld, any lapse of judgment in extending his conception to the guilt stage, as a variant of
the defense of excuse, is mine alone.
408. Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 72, at 268.
409. Id.
410. Id.; see also ZIMRING, supra note 15, at 80-81.
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principle but resist its application to capital and other lesser, though seri-
ous, offenses. Courts and legislatures must resist the temptation to limit
the availability of diminished responsibility to small offenses. This is
more than a pragmatic concern; it goes to the heart of the meaning of
and justification for the excuse. Zimring urges, "if the doctrine of
diminished responsibility means anything in relation to the punishment
of immature offenders, its impact cannot be limited to trivial cases.
Diminished responsibility is either generally applicable or generally
unpersuasive as a mitigating principle." 4" Thus, a youth discount must
apply to all crimes committed by youth, even and most importantly
those the law categorizes as capital offenses. As Zimring further
explains, "[t]here is no logical basis for limiting the scope of a mitiga-
tion principle because the harm caused by the criminal act is great. Doc-
trines of diminished responsibility have their greatest impact when large
injuries have been caused by actors not fully capable of understanding
and self-control."4 2 The death of a person is the largest injury one can
inflict; the law must not compound that injury by taking the life of any-
one who, by virtue of his youth, is not fully responsible for his actions.
c. Proportionate Responsibility
A further question is how to recognize the social nature of human
behavior, particularly during adolescence, in a criminal justice system
based on principles of individual accountability. Accomplice liability
and other principles holding co-offenders equally responsible have long
existed alongside the individualistic underpinnings of the criminal law.
The problem is that the law has divorced those principles of shared
responsibility from principles of proportionate liability. Instead of mak-
ing all co-offenders fully responsible for a single crime, a juvenile jus-
tice oriented policy would apportion responsibility among the individual
co-offenders. Particularly with juveniles, we must be holistic and not
merely punitive in our approach to righting a wrong through our crimi-
411. ZIMRNC, supra note 15, at 84. Zimring explains, further:
From manslaughter to first degree murder, the range of minimum punishment is
from probation to life imprisonment or execution, and the elements that differentiate
these crimes are almost exclusively the subjective features of intent, advertence, and
motivation that highlight the importance of doctrines of diminished responsibility.
When the difference between premeditation (first degree murder) and malice
(second degree murder) can mean fifteen years' more imprisonment and when
equally lethal acts can be punished by probation (if negligent) or long imprisonment
(if grossly reckless), a defendant's youth and immaturity should have a very large
influence on the level of deserved punishment.
Id. at 140 (internal citations omitted).
412. Id. at 84.
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nal laws. Accordingly, our criminal justice system must embrace princi-
ples of proportionate responsibility.
4. SENTENCING CONSIDERATIONS
a. Background
The pair of Supreme Court cases that first decided the applicability
of the death penalty to adolescents 4 3 and mentally retarded persons4
14
are temporally and theoretically inseparable.415 Until 2002, those rul-
ings held that both adolescents and those who are mentally retarded
could be subject to the ultimate criminal sanction of death. ' 6 Then, in
Atkins v. Virginia,4 1 7 the Supreme Court broke with precedent and found
that mentally retarded persons "do not act with the level of moral culpa-
bility that characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct. '4 1s The
Court explained, further, that although "their deficiencies do not warrant
an exemption from criminal sanctions, . . . they do diminish their per-
sonal culpability." '4 19 The Court continued:
Because of their impairments, however, by definition [mentally
retarded persons] have diminished capacities to understand and pro-
cess information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and
learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control
impulses, and to understand the reactions of others. There . . . is
abundant evidence that they often act on impulse rather than pursuant
to a premeditated plan, and that in group settings they are followers
rather than leaders.42 °
413. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
414. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
415. On the same day in 1989, the Supreme Court decided that the Constitution does not
prohibit the execution of sixteen and seventeen year-olds, Stanford, or of mentally retarded
persons, Penry. The Court's reasoning was the same for both: the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment does not preclude the execution of a person solely because
of his mental retardation, Penry, 492 U.S. at 340, or his youth, Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380.
416. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380; Penry, 492 U.S. at 340.
417. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
418. Id. at 306.
419. Id. at 318.
420. Id. (citing J. McGee & F. Menolascino, The Evaluation of Defendants with Mental
Retardation in the Criminal Justice System, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND MENTAL
RETARDATION 55, 58-60 (R. Conley, R. Luckasson, & G. Bouthilet eds., 1992); Kenneth L.
Appelbaum & Paul S. Appelbaum, Criminal-Justice Related Competencies in Defendants with
Mental Retardation, 14 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 483, 487-89 (1994); James Ellis & Ruth Luckasson,
Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 429 (1985); Levy-Shiff,
Kedem, & Sevillia, Ego Identity in Mentally Retarded Adolescents, 94 AM. J. MENTAL
RETARDATION 541, 547 (1990); Thomas L. Whitman, Self Regulation and Mental Retardation, 94
AM. J. MENTAL RETARDATION 347, 360 (1990); Caroline Everington & Solomon M. Fulero,
Competence to Confess: Measuring Understanding and Suggestibility of Defendants with Mental
Retardation, 37 MENTAL RETARDATION 212, 212-13 (1999).
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If we did not know that the Court was describing mentally retarded
persons, we might well believe it was speaking of adolescents. 2 '
Because of the many similarities between the mentally retarded and
those temporarily disabled by their youth, the advent of Atkins creates an
opportunity, if not the responsibility, for the Supreme Court, and for
state courts and legislatures that have not already done so, to abolish the
juvenile death penalty. Failing that, those bodies must acknowledge
Atkins' implications for capital sentencing and the assessment of adoles-
cent criminality and responsibility. The reforms suggested here reflect
my nascent thinking about a sentencing regime that continues to
embrace the death penalty for juvenile offenders.
b. Aggravating Circumstances
The modem death penalty era began with Furman v. Georgia,422
which condemned as unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment
juries' then "unfettered" 423 discretion in capital sentencing. In the years
following Furman, the Supreme Court approved various legislative
enactments which, the Court ruled, had sufficiently narrowed the class
of offenders to whom the death penalty would apply to pass constitu-
tional muster.424 The most prominent of those early post-Furman cases,
Gregg v. Georgia,425 approved a Georgia sentencing statute containing
specific aggravating and mitigating circumstances, ruling that it pro-
vided the "guided discretion" necessary to accomplish the narrowing
required by the Eighth Amendment.426 Seven years later, however, the
Court announced a rule in Zant v. Stephens4 27 that permits the state, once
421. See supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text. The Atkins Court reasoned, further, that
the diminished ability of mentally retarded persons justifies "a categorical rule making such
offenders ineligible for the death penalty" to avoid the risk of wrongful execution not only by the
possibility of false confessions, but also by the lesser ability of mentally retarded defendants to
make a persuasive showing of mitigation in the face of prosecutorial evidence of one or more
aggravating factors. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320. Mentally retarded defendants may be less able to
give meaningful assistance to their counsel and are typically poor witnesses, and their demeanor
may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their crimes. As Penry
demonstrated, moreover, reliance on mental retardation as a mitigating factor can be a two-edged
sword that may enhance the likelihood that the aggravating factor of future dangerousness will be
found by the jury. Mentally retarded defendants in the aggregate face a special risk of wrongful
execution. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320.
422. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (condemning as violative of the Eighth
Amendment the arbitrary and capricious nature of the death penalty as imposed under current
law).
423. Id. at 247.
424. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt
v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
425. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
426. Id. at 196-98.
427. Zant v. Stevens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
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it has proven one statutory aggravating circumstance, to introduce any
and all evidence, both statutory and non-statutory, of aggravation.428
Since Stephens, aggravators have proliferated.42 9
The ease of proving a threshold aggravator in most capital cases
involving juvenile offenders post-Stephens creates nearly insurmounta-
ble hurdles for adolescent capital defendants.43 ° Moreover, because of
the over-inclusiveness Stephens permits, it fails to perform the function
of imposing death only on those who deserve it. For example, nearly
every state capital sentencing regime establishes as one of its list of
aggravators the commission of murder "in the course of another fel-
ony. ' '43 ' Nearly every juvenile offender on death row qualifies for this
aggravator,432 and it is not surprising that they do. Most adolescents do
not set out to commit homicide, but to obtain some easy cash or jack a
car.4 3 3 It is a simple fact of adolescence.
Moreover, for murders made death-eligible through application of
the felony-murder rule, the "other felony" aggravator permits double
counting of a single circumstance. This inequity is magnified by the
high proportion of those on death row who were convicted of felony
murder.434 The persistence of the "other felony" aggravator assures that
capital sentencing "remains available for persons convicted of felony-
murder regardless whether the defendant intended to commit, attempted
to commit, or actually committed murder. '4 35 Indeed, states have exe-
cuted several "non-triggermen" since Furman.43 6
Other aggravating circumstances have a particularly punitive effect
when applied to adolescents. The common "future dangerousness"
aggravating circumstance often transforms a defendant's youth from a
mitigator into an aggravator, based on jurors' false conception that any-
one who kills so young must be destined to kill again. Similarly,
aggravators such as "committing a murder as a part of a gang activity or
to advance one's position in a gang" and "creating a grave risk of death
for one or more persons" burden youth, who by virtue of their age, act in
428. Id. at 876-79.
429. See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances: The Paradox of
Today's Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345
(1998); see also Steiker & Steiker, supra note 382, at 376.
430. I do not mean to suggest that the young alone face substantial obstacles in the sentencing
regimes approved by and enacted pursuant to Stephens. Certainly all capital defendants face the
obstacles discussed here.
431. See James R. Acker & C.S. Lanier, Parsing this Lexicon of Death, 30 CRiM. L. BULL.
107, 121 (1994).
432. See App. A.
433. Id.
434. See supra notes 378-80 and accompanying text.




concert with others through the overwhelming adolescent need for group
affiliation. So, too, motivating factors such as "pecuniary gain" and "no
apparent motive" have particular relevance for youth.
Retaining factors such as those identified here, and others, as con-
stitutionally permissible aggravators is contrary to what we know about
youth. It is beyond dispute that adolescents are prone to group offend-
ing, peer pressure, poor judgment, impulsivity, and a host of other mark-
ers of adolescence that are shed as we mature into adulthood. In a just
and therapeutic legal system, these aggravating factors would become
mitigators when dealing with the capital sentencing of youth.
c. Mitigation and Mercy
In Woodson v. North Carolina,437 the Supreme Court held that the
"fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment"
requires that each capital defendant be treated as an individual. 438 The
Court elaborated on the Woodson principle in Lockett v. Ohio,4 39 where
it stated that "the sentencer must not be precluded from considering, as a
mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death.""4  Even so, jurors still feel constrained to
impose death if they find even a single aggravator.441
Blystone v. Pennsylvania442 provides a concrete example of the
harm done to defendants under the current system. Pennsylvania law
provided that, although Blystone had presented no mitigating evidence
at sentencing, the jury could still find mitigating circumstances based
upon their review of all the evidence from the guilt and sentencing
stages.443 During their deliberations, the Blystone jury twice asked the
court for a definition of mitigation and, the second time, asked further
whether the law required them to impose the death penalty if they found
one aggravating circumstance but no specific mitigating circum-
437. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality opinion).
438. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 301 ("evolving standards of decency," as well as the ideal of human
dignity underlying the Eighth Amendment, require individualized sentencing).
439. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608-09 (1978) (plurality opinion).
440. Id. at 606. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (striking down death
sentence imposed in the mistaken impression that defendant's troubled youth was not mitigating
evidence).
441. See, e.g., Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990). This is why categorical
exclusions are necessary to protect certain particularly vulnerable classes of individuals. See
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
442. Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990).
443. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 (1998).
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stance.' 4 Each time, the judge failed to respond to jurors' apparent con-
fusion and simply reread the initial instructions, which did not define
mitigation." 5 The jurors returned to their deliberations and delivered a
sentence of death. 46
Explicit consideration of mercy would provide a mechanism for
jurors to give effect to their not uncommon sense of frustration and con-
fusion about the role of mitigation in the individualized sentencing deci-
sion. Nothing in the line of cases following Woodson and Lockett
suggests that considerations of mercy violate the Constitution." 7 How-
ever, although philosophers have long grappled with questions of the
role of mercy in the exaction of punishment for acts society con-
demns,44 8 and a few notable criminal law scholars have focused on the
concept of mercy," 9 the courts have been, for the most part, silent. On
the rare occasion when the Supreme Court has expressly considered
mercy, "its talk [has been] neither prominent nor especially illuminat-
ing.'"450 But once a jury concludes that a defendant is "death-eligible,"
the individualized sentencing mandated by the Eighth Amendment45'
444. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Writ of Habeas Corpus at 64, Blystone et al. v.
Horn, No. 99-490 (W.D. Pa. Filed Mar. 29, 2000).
445. Id.
446. Blystone, 494 U.S. at 302.
447. See Kirchmeier, supra note 429; see also Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Let God
Sort Them Out?: Refining the Individualization Requirement in Capital Sentencing, 102 YALE L.
J. 835, 862-66 (1992) (reviewing BEVERLY LOWRY, CROSSED OVER: A MURDER, A MEMOIR
(1992) (telling the story of Karla Faye Tucker's life)).
448. See, e.g., SENECA, On Mercy, in SENECA: MORAL AND POLIICAL ESSAYS (John M.
Cooper & J.F. Procope eds. & trans., 1995); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Mercy and Legal Justice, in
JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 162 (1988); Joshua Dressler,
Hating Criminals: How Can Something That Feels So Good Be Wrong?, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1448,
1468-73 (1990); H. Scott Hestevold, Justice to Mercy, 46 PHIL. & PHENOM. RES. 281 (1985);
Claudia Card, On Mercy, 81 PHIL. REV. 182 (1972); Alwynne Smart, Mercy, 43 PHIL. 345 (1968).
449. See Martha Nussbaum, Loving v. Virginia and the Literary Imagination, 17 QUINNIPIAC
L. REV. 337 (1997); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in
Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996); Martha C. Nussbaum, Poets As Judges: Judicial
Rhetoric and the Literary Imagination, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1477 (1995); Martha C. Nussbaum,
The Use and Abuse of Philosophy in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1627 (1993): see also
Dan M. Kahan, The Anatomy of Disgust in Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1621 (1998); Stephen
P. Garvey, "As the Gentle Rain from Heaven ": Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81 CORNELL L. REV.
989 (1996); Andrew von Hirsch, Equality, "Anisonomy," and Justice: A Review of Madness and
the Criminal Law, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1107 (1984) (book review).
450. Garvey, supra note 449, at 991. The Court at times characterizes mercy as "a benevolent
virtue for which the law should make room," and at other times, as a source of irrationality that is
bound to produce arbitrary and capricious results. Compare California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538,
563 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from ruling upholding death penalty in challenge to jury
instruction that "mere ... sympathy" should play no part in the jury's decision), with Morgan v.
Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 739 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting from reversal of death sentence and
criticizing the majority for holding that no one who was "merciless" could sit on a capital jury).
451. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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makes considerations of mercy indispensable to rendering justice.452 A
full exploration of possible avenues for assuring the proper considera-
tion of mercy in capital sentencing is beyond the purview of this article;
however, one thought bears mention here.
One of the common criticisms of allowing mercy as a consideration
in capital sentencing is that it permits those who "deserve" to die to
escape death.453 Those critiques, however, fail to grasp the essence of
mercy. Mercy is by definition available only to those who deserve to be
punished; that is, in capital cases, only those the jury has determined, on
the basis of the harm wrought by their actions, "deserve" to be sentenced
to death.45 4 Thus, whether one deserves to die is irrelevant in the
"mercy" phase of sentencing. At the mercy phase, sentencers must
embrace only those mitigators (and aggravators) that provide a reason to
grant (or not to grant) mercy, and must decline to consider those that
provide a basis for believing that death is or is not deserved. For exam-
ple, evidence that a murder was committed in a particularly "cruel and
heinous" fashion is a common aggravating circumstance that often pro-
vides the basis for imposing the death penalty. It cannot, however, be
used as a reason to refuse a plea for mercy. Having decided that the
defendant deserves to die because of the "cruel and heinous" nature of
his crime, jurors must then look to the character of the defendant to
determine whether, despite the monstrosity of his crime, his life should
be spared.455
452. See, e.g., Jeffrie G. Murphy, Forgiveness, Mercy, and the Retributive Emotions, CRIM.
JUST. ETHICS Summer/Fall 1988, at 3, 12 ("This demand for individuation-a tailoring of our
retributive response to the individual natures of the persons with whom we are dealing-is a part
of what we mean by taking persons seriously as persons and is thus a basic demand of justice.");
Eric L. Muller, The Virtue of Mercy in Criminal Sentencing, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 288, 330-38
(1993) (defining the role of mercy in criminal sentencing).
453. See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 447, at 862 ("Openended capital sentencing
schemes are not troublesome merely because they might impose death when it is not 'deserved'
according to actual community consensus, but also because they might fail to impose the death
penalty when it is 'deserved.' "). But see David McCord, Judging the Effectiveness of the
Supreme Court's Death Penalty Jurisprudence According to the Court's Own Goals: Mild
Success or Major Disaster?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 545 (1997) (criticizing Steiker & Steiker and
others he labels "academic underinclusionists").
454. See Garvey, supra note 449, at 1013. See generally Dan M. Kahan & Martha C.
Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996);
Murphy, supra note 452, at 20, 25.
455. See Garvey, supra note 449, for an illuminating discussion of the role of mercy in capital
sentencing and a proposal for assuring its proper inclusion in the sentencing phase of capital
proceedings. See also Jenkins v. State, 498 S.E.2d 502, 515 (Ga. 1998) (approving death sentence
in which trial judge instructed jurors that they could "return a life sentence for any reason or no
reason at all, and that they could consider 'feelings of sympathy and mercy that flow from the
evidence") (citing O.C.G.A. 17-10-2(c) (instructing judges to conduct pre-sentence hearings in
capital cases, where jurors consider whether any statutory aggravators or mitigators exist and
"whether to recommend mercy")).
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For juvenile offenders, distinguishing between the nature of the
harm done and the nature of the harm-doer is crucial. By virtue of their
years, adolescents have had little opportunity to exercise autonomous
control over the development of their character. Who they are is much
more a product of biology and environment than of their own free
choice. Mercy recognizes these truisms and affords jurors the opportu-
nity to withhold the ultimate punishment from those who, though they
acted badly, are not bad persons.
VII. CONCLUSION
Beyond the formulation of juvenile and criminal justice policy in
general, making a place in the law for consideration of the role of peer
influence and group offending in adolescent violence is essential to save
lives. As with adult criminals, in youth crime the question of legal cau-
sation is paramount. Juvenile criminology is founded on the principle
that children and youth are less responsible for their actions than adults
because they are not yet fully developed; they are by definition less
mature. Although juveniles charged with murder are tried "as adults" in
criminal court rather than in juvenile court, the forum for the trial does
not change the nature of those being tried. Teens who kill are not trans-
formed into adults by virtue of the commission of the crime, or by the
transfer of jurisdiction from the juvenile court to the adult criminal
court. In the criminal courtroom, "the kid [may be] a criminal but the
criminal is still a kid."456
Our juvenile and criminal justice systems must join in a common
strategy to serve the complex needs of juveniles and society. The most
important component of that strategy is a consensus on basic principles
of penal proportionality and the immaturity of youth. Those principles
must undergird all proceedings involving youth, and particularly capital
proceedings, where the stakes are so high and the consequences irrevers-
ible. We must allow our young people to recover from their youth.
Executing them is not the solution.




JUVENILE OFFENDERS ON DEATH ROW
NAME D' Vi  INFLUENCE NATURE OF CRIME CDS i  DP iv
Acuna, Robert Alone N Robbery of NM
Aaron residence
Adams, Alone N Burglary of residence, NM
Renaldo Chante sexual assault
Adams, Alone A Burglary of residence, A
Thomas Mark marijuana
Aguilar, Alone S Drive-by shooting NM
Tonatihu
Alvarado, D + 2 A Gang Drug deal at Vs' NM
Steven Brian residence
Arroyo, Randy D + 2 S Gang Carjacked RX7 to 1D, 1T J
steal parts
Arthur, Mark D + 2 A Wife of Revenge, kill abusive IL, 1P NM
Sam victim husband
Barraza, Mauro Alone S High Burglary of residence, NM
Morris sexual assault
Bernal, Johnnie D + 4 S High Drive-by robbery NM
Bonds, James D + 1 S Burglary of rental NM
Willis office
Bonifay, James D + 2 S Older cousin Revenge for firing 2T A
Patrick cousin
Bridgewater, D + I S Co-D Burglary of residence A
Roy
Capetillo, D + 4 A High, other Burglary of residence NM
Edward Brian Ds
Chapman, D + 5 A Revenge against A
Lamorris J. cheating girlfriend
Cobb, Alone N High Burglary of residence A
Raymond Levi
Craig, Dale D + 3 S Carjacking of Bronco IL, 2T J
Dwayne
Davis, Timothy Alone A Burglary of grocery J
Charles store, sexual assault
Dewberry, John D + 1 A Adult brother Revenge for gay IL J
Curtis advances
D = Defendant; + # = Number of co-defendants or accomplices.
V = Victim. Victim classifications are: A = Acquaintance; F = Family member; N =
Neighbor; P = Police officer; S = Stranger.
" CDS = Co-Defendant's sentence, if known. D = Death; L = Life; P = Probation; T =
Term of years.
" DP = Defendant's priors. A = Adult record; J = Juvenile record; N = No record; NM =
None mentioned; NSH = No significant history of prior criminal acts (as defined by the states
using this category).
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NAME D' V INFLUENCE NATURE OF CRIME CDS " DP"
Dickens, Justin Alone, S Drug dealer Burglary of jewelry NM
Wiley but store
Dixon, Anthony Alone, S Carjacking of red A
Tyrone but T'bird
Dominguez, Alone A Revenge for dissing J
Michael girlfriend
(Miguel)
Duke, Mark D + 3 F Revenge, not getting ID NM
Anthony dad's truck
Duncan, Trace D + 3 S High Kidnapping, sexual 2D, IL NSH
Royal assault
Dycus, Kelvin D + I N Burglary of residence NM
B16
Eskridge, D + 4 S Robbery of stranger NM
Roderick
Foster, Ronald Alone, A 12 beers Burglary of Superette IT N
Chris but store
Gibson, Alone S Burglary of grocery NM
Exzavious Lee store
Golphin, Kevin D + I P Adult brother Carijacking at finance ID NM
Salvador office
Guillen, Derek D + 4 N Burglary of residence NM
Jermaine
Hart, Gary D + I S Adult co-D Burglary of restaurant NM
Davis II
Holly, William D + 2 S Carjacking of taxicab NM
Joseph
Horn, Patrick Alone, S Drug-related NM
but kidnapping, sexual
assault
Howard, Cedric D + 9 A Gang Burglary of residence ID, 2L J
D'Wayne
Hughes, D + 1 S Uncle, beers Burglary of video IT, 1P N
Herman Lee Jr. poker parlor
Hughes, Kevin Alone A Sexual assault, young N
girls
Hyde, James D + 2 A Co-D Revenge, co-D IT NSH
Matthew planned hit against
witness
Jackson, Levi D + 2 S Gang Carjacking IT J
Jaimes
Jenkins, Larry Alone, S Burglary of NM
Leonarde but laundromat
Johnson, Eddie D + 2 S Gang Robbery in home NM
C. driveway

























Loggins, D + 3 S High Kidnapping, sexual 2D, IL NSH
Kenneth assault
Lopez, Michael D + 5 P High, gang Evading arrest for NM
Anthony, Jr. probation violation
McGilberry, D + 1 F Revenge, family NM
Stephen Virgil Bronco taken away
Monterrubio, D + I A Sexual assault IL NM
Jose Ignacio
Morgan, Eric D + I S Robbery of IT NM
Dale convenience store
Neal, John Alone S Burglary of residence NM
Lionel
Perez, Efrian D + 7 S High, gang Gang initiation, 4D, IT NM
sexual assault
Powers, Ted Alone S Burglary of residence NM
Benjamin
Pressley, D + 2 S Burglary of pawn NSH
Marcus shop
Dewayne
Ramirez, D + I N Burglary of residence IL NM
Nathan
Reeves, D + I A Revenge, testimony NM
Whitney against co-D
Salinas, Jorge D + 2 S Carjacking NM
Alfredo
Slaton, Nathan Alone N Shooting BB gun, J
D. sexual assault
Solomon, D + 2 S High Robbery of man in NM
Christopher disabled vehicle
Julian
Soriano, D + I S Burglary of N
Oswaldo convenience store
Regaldo
Soto-Fong, D + 2 A Burglary of El J





V INFLUENCE NATURE OF CRIME CDS
N Revenge for Ns'
complaint, sexual
assault
S Revenge for abuse of
friend
A Burglary of residence
S Robbery of campers
A Revenge for kicking ID
D out, sexual assault
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D V INFLUENCE NATURE OF CRIME
D + 3 S Burglary of yogurt
shop
D + 2 A Adult co-D, Revenge, competition
gang over a woman.
D + 7 S High, gang. Gang initiation,
sexual assault
Alone S Burglary of Hardee's
Alone S Carijacking, sexual
assault








Alone, A Burglary of Hardee's NSH
but after firing
2L
4D, IT
